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MARKET SHARE LIABILITY BEYOND DES CASES
I. INTRODUCTION
Lured by success in the tobacco litigation, a handful of plaintiffs' firms now are
targeting manufacturers of lead paint and lead pigment, products that played a role
in causing childhood lead poisoning.' Victims of childhood lead poisoning suing
these manufacturers, however, face a seemingly insurmountable obstacle. The law
ordinarily requires a plaintiff to identify the specific tortfeasor who caused the
harm.2 This identification is virtually impossible in the lead paint context. The
deteriorated lead paint that caused the harm almost always consists of many layers
of paint, applied over a period as long as a century, now buried under additional
layers of lead-free paint.' It is practically impossible, therefore, for a victim to
prove which specific manufacturer produced the lead paint, or the lead pigment in
the paint, that caused the harm.4
Enter "market share liability," a doctrine developed in the 1980s to circumvent
the causation problems encountered by plaintiffs in a highly specific type of
litigation: lawsuits brought by women suffering from certain cancers against
manufacturers of the miscarriage preventative diethylstilbestrol (DES), which the
victims' mothers took during pregnancy.5 The victims of DES could not causally
connect their diseases to the drug produced by any specific manufacturer, so the
California Supreme Court, in Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,6 pioneered an
alternative means of proving cause-in-fact known as market share liability.7 This
theory presumes that the amount of harm caused by each manufacturer is
proportional to its share of the market for DES.8 By holding a DES manufacturer
liable for its market share proportion of total damages, fairness was achieved.
In DES cases, the products always were chemically identical, as required by the
Food and Drug Administration,9 and always were consumed in less than a nine-
1. Saundra Torry, Lead Paint Could Be Next Big Legal Target, WASH. POST, June 10, 1999, at
A I ("Armed with new legal theories, trial lawyers and politicians locally and across the nation are
gearing up to mount a major assault on the former makers of lead paint .... The potential battle
borrows much of its inspiration from the recent legal assault on big tobacco-a confrontation that wrung
a $240 billion settlement from cigarette makers after states took on the industry in a series of
lawsuits."). On February 22, 2006, a Rhode Island jury found three manufacturers of lead pigment
liable, the first trial court verdict against such manufacturers. Charles Forelle, Rhode Island Wins Lead-
Paint Suit, WALL ST. J., Feb. 23, 2006, at D7.
2. See infra notes 34, 81 and accompanying text.
3. See infra notes 32-22 and accompanying text.
4. See infra notes 79-84 and accompanying text.
5. See generally Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 927-28, 936-37 (Cal. 1980) (discussing
the problems of proving causation in DES cases and creating the doctrine of market share liability as
a remedy); Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theory of Enterprise Liability, 46
FORDHAM L. REv. 963, 972-74 (1978) (describing how DES cases presented unique problems with
proving "the crucial issue of case-in-fact because most plaintiffs could not 'identify the manufacturer
of the drug ingested by their mothers"').
6. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
7. Id. at 937.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 933.
2006]
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month period. These highly unusual facts allowed courts to determine the market
shares of various DES manufacturers at least somewhat accurately. ° Chemical
identity also made it reasonable to assume that the manufacturers' respective
market shares reflected the amount of harm each manufacturer caused."
But what of the possible extension of market share liability to other products
that caused latent diseases, but that could not be traced from victim to
manufacturer? In the quarter century after Sindell, injured victims frequently tried
to convince courts to extend market share liability beyond the DES context. 2 With
the rarest of exceptions, 3 such attempts failed because courts found that other
products were not "fungible."' 4 Fungibility, the notion that certain goods are
interchangeable, 5 became the talisman required for market share liability, but
fungibility was never really defined, described, or understood by courts.16 Nor did
scholars untangle the meanings of fungibility until Allen Rostron's groundbreaking
article in 2004, which advocated a broader variant of market share liability called
"proportional share liability.' 7
Almost immediately upon the heels of Rostron's article, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court, in Thomas v. Mallett,t8 adopted Rostron's analytical framework,
if not many of his conclusions.' 9 The Thomas court used Rostron's analysis to
10. See id at 937 ("It is probably impossible, with the passage of time, to determine market share
with mathematical exactitude. But... the difficulty of apportioning damages among the defendant
producers in exact relation to their market share does not seriously militate against the rule we adopt.").
11. See id. at 936, 937 (noting that DES was produced from an "identical formula" and holding
that it was reasonable "to measure the likelihood that any of the defendants supplied the product which
allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by each of them... bears to the entire
production of the drug sold by all").
12. E.g., George v. Housing Auth. of New Orleans, 906 So. 2d 1282 (La. Ct. App. 2005) (fire
alarms); McGuinness v. Wakefern Corp., 608 A.2d 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991) (lasagna ingredients);
Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001) (handguns).
13. In re Methyl Tertiary Buytl Ether ("MTBE") Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 621-22
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (methyl tertiary butyl ether); Ray v. Cutter Labs., 754 F. Supp. 193, 195-96 (M.D. Fla.
1991) (Factor VIII, human plasma product); Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1348
(C.D. Cal. 1987) (diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccines); Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 109, 111 (Ct. App. 1992) (asbestos break pads); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717
(Haw. 1991) (Factor VIII); Russo v. Material Handling Specialties Co., No. 9101209, 1995 WL
1146853, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1995) (airline beverage carts).
14. E.g., George, 906 So. 2d at 1287; McGuinness, 608 A.2d at 447; Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at
1067.
15. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 698 (8th ed. 2004).
16. See infra Parts III.B, IV.A.1.
17. Allen Rostron, Beyond Market Share Liability: A Theory of Proportional Share Liability for
Nonfungible Products, 52 UCLA L. REV. 151 (2004).
18. 701 N.W.2d 526, 567 (Wis. 2005).
19. Rostron and the Thomas court disagree on the ultimate relevance of fungibility. Rostron
initially identifies three ways in which the courts have defined fungibility: (1) functional
interchangeability, (2) physical indistinguishability, and (3) uniformity of risk. Rostron, supra note 17,
at 163-67. Rostron later argues, however, that only the uniformity of risk definition is appropriate for
market share liability. Id. at 168. More than this, Rostron believes that fungibility is irrelevant under his
theory of proportional share liability. Id. at 168-69; see infra Part V.A. The Thomas court, on the other
hand, adopts Rostron's three definitions of fungibility and uses them to hold that lead pigment is
4
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extend Wisconsin's variant of market share liability, known as "risk contribution
theory," to actions against lead pigment manufacturers. ° Meanwhile, the Maryland
legislature debated a proposal to extend market share liability to lead paint
manufacturers.2'
Market share liability has thus awoken from its long slumber. Will it be the
vehicle to circumvent the traditional element of particularized causation, enabling
the judiciary to solve the financing issues associated with the lead poisoning
epidemic? To answer this question, it is necessary for the first time to determine the
appropriate boundaries of market share liability in light of the policies that justify
its radical departure from traditional principles of causation.22 This Article
undertakes that task. Examining market share liability in the lead paint context is
important both as a matter of social policy, given the importance of childhood lead
poisoning in our society,23 and as an arena in which to test and refine the parameters
of market share liability.
2 4
Part II begins by reviewing the California Supreme Court's seminal opinion in
Sindell and extracting from it the policies that undergird market share liability. We
then argue that the oft-articulated talisman of fungibility should be viewed more
accurately as a proxy for two presumptions that are functional requirements of
market share liability: uniformity of risk and the practical impossibility of
manufacturer identification. In addition to these requirements, we suggest that the
judicial capacity to determine market shares in a meaningful manner is a third
requirement of market share liability implicit in Sindell.
In Part III, we briefly describe the lead poisoning epidemic and then analyze
the reasoning of pre-Thomas opinions that refused to extend market share liability
to the lead paint context.
Part IV analyzes how both Rostron and the Wisconsin Supreme Court in
Thomas severed the implicit link between fungibility and chemical identity, thereby
allowing the plaintiff in Thomas to proceed against lead pigment manufacturers on
a risk contribution theory. To do so, the Thomas court adopted the three definitions
of fungibility that Rostron identifies: (1) functional interchangeability, (2) physical
indistinguishability, and (3) uniformity of risk. The Wisconsin Supreme Court
ignored Rostron's conclusions that uniformity of risk alone was the key to the
application of market share liability and that the other two factors were significant
fungible. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 560-61. Rostron and the Thomas court disagree on a second issue.
Rostron recognizes that the lead paint context makes it difficult, if not impracticable, to determine the
market shares of various lead paint manufacturers. Rostron, supra note 17, at 209. The Thomas court,
in contrast, acknowledges but does not address the problem of determining market shares, presumably
leaving that up to a jury. See Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 562-63.
20. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 567.
21. See H.B. 1394,2006 Leg., 421 st Sess. (Md. 2006), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/2006rs/
bills/hb/hb1394f.pdf (last visited, Oct. 10, 2006).
22. See infra Part II.
23. See infra Part III.A.
24. See infra Parts IV, V.
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only because their presence makes it difficult to trace a particular victim's harm to
a specific manufacturer's product. 5
In Part V, we survey and analyze the existing jurisprudence on market share
liability, excluding DES cases, in light of the three judicial definitions of fungibility
identified by Rostron and adopted by the Wisconsin Supreme Court. We conclude
that any single definition, standing alone, yields results that are both under- and
over-inclusive of the outcomes expected given the foundational presumptions of
market share liability. Requiring all three definitions to be met equally is
unsatisfactory because it is tantamount to equating fungibility with chemical
identity. Finally, we demonstrate how allowing courts to use the three definitions
as factors in a balancing test already has yielded dramatically inconsistent results
because of the inherent subjectivity of multi-factor tests.
Part VI lays out our alternative formulation of the requirements of market share
liability that departs from granting talismanic status to fungibility and corresponds
more closely with the policies that justify market share liability in the first place.
We propose the application of market share liability be predicated on three
requirements:
(1) Uniform products must pose risk in a uniform manner and to a
uniform degree;26
(2) It must be impossible, as a practical matter, for a victim to trace the
harm-causing product back to its specific manufacturer; and
(3) Courts must be able to ascertain each manufacturer's market share
with a reasonable degree of accuracy.
In several regards, these proposed requirements make it easier for victims to
employ market share liability than it was under any regime requiring chemical
identity. Additionally, it probably will be easier for plaintiffs to satisfy our
reformulated requirements than to prevail under Thomas if courts understand that
case to require plaintiffs to satisfy all three interpretations of fungibility as
described by Rostron and the Wisconsin Supreme Court. Our third requirement,
forcing courts to focus explicitly on whether it is possible to determine the
25. Rostron, supra note 17, at 165.
26. We take no position on Rostron's thesis that even when products do not pose uniform degrees
of risk, it may be possible to employ proportionate liability by starting with market share allocations
but taking into account the relative degree of risk caused by each product. See id. at 174. Certainly as
a matter of theory and logic, we find this notion unobjectionable. We do note, however, that the jury's
ability to determine each manufacturer's appropriate share of financial liability becomes significantly
more complex when it must determine not only the market share but also the relative degree of risk
posed by each manufacturer's product. Adding yet another complication to a trial court's analysis that
in many instances already seems impossibly complex is not promising. See generally infra Part VI.C
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respective manufacturers' market shares with a meaningful degree of accuracy, is
arguably the most crucial requirement but the one largely ignored by courts and
commentators until now.27 Most important, our purposive reformulation of the
conditions justifying the application of market share liability aligns these
requirements with the underlying justifications for the doctrine for the first time.
II. FOUNDATIONAL PREMISES OF MARKET SHARE LIABILITY
A. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories," the California Supreme Court devised
market share liability to allow victims of the defective miscarriage preventative
diethylstilbestrol (DES) to recover for their injuries. 29 From 1947 to 1971, over two
hundred drug manufacturers produced DES using an identical formula that was
never patented.3 ° Concomitantly, it was prescribed for millions of expectant
mothers. 1 In 1971, the Food and Drug Administration ordered manufacturers to
pull DES from the market after studies showed that daughters whose mothers had
consumed the drug had an increased risk of developing vaginal and cervical
cancer.32 Shortly thereafter, "DES daughters" across the country filed suit, seeking
to hold drug manufacturers liable for their injuries.33 They could not establish
traditional tort liability, however, because they could not identify the specific
manufacturer whose drug their mothers took during pregnancy.34 To sidestep the
causation problem, the Sindell court created a market share theory of liability.35
Under this theory, each manufacturer was liable for damages in proportion to its
share of the DES market.36
The Sindell court justified the imposition of liability under a relaxed standard
of causation for policy reasons familiar in tort law. The court reasoned that
"between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter should bear the
cost of the injury. 37 Additionally, the court believed that drug manufacturers were
27. Rostron is the notable exception to this statement. He concludes that proportional share
liability is inappropriate in situations where (1) a significantly "diffuse and varied set of products"
causes the harm, (2) the timing of the manufacture and distribution of the product causing plaintiffs
harm cannot be determined, or (3) there is no signature injury, and uncertainty about the product that
caused the harm as well as concerning the identity of the specific manufacturer. Rostron, supra note 17,
at 207-11. Each of these factors addresses what we regard as the competency of courts to meaningfully
determine market shares.
28. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
29. Id. at 937.
30. Sheiner, supra note 5, at 963 & n.l, 964 & n.4.
31. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 927.
32. See id. at 925.
33. Id. at 927.
34. Id. at 927-28.
35. Id. at 936-37.
36. Id. at 937.
37. Id. at 936 (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948)).
2006]
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in a better position to both absorb the cost of injury and minimize future harm.38
The Sindell court concluded:
In our contemporary complex industrialized society, advances
in science and technology create fungible goods which may harm
consumers and which cannot be traced to any specific producer.
The response of the courts can be either to adhere rigidly to prior
doctrine, denying recovery to those injured by such products, or
to fashion remedies to meet these changing needs.39
B. "Fungibility" as a Proxy for Uniformity of Risk and Impossibility of
Manufacturer Identification
The Sindell court explicitly discussed fungibility when it provided the policy
rationale for imposing market share liability, but the court did not refer to
fungibility when it explained the mechanics of the theory.4" In fact, the California
Supreme Court never held that DES was a "fungible good"; rather, the court found
it dispositive that DES was produced from an "identical formula."'" This may or
may not merely be a semantic distinction. Is fungibility the same as chemical
identity, or are the two concepts separate and distinct? Is chemical identity required
for the meaningful application of market share liability, or will some other form of
product similarity or relationship suffice? In Part V, we analyze courts' differing
interpretations of fungibility. Any such analysis, however, must begin with an
understanding of the policies that justify market share liability because these
policies circumscribe the boundaries of the theory.
Market share liability was devised to address the injustice that results when
manufacturers of uniformly defective products escape liability solely because their
products cannot be traced back to them.42 The doctrine is based on two foundational
presumptions. First, all of the products made by all of the manufacturers must be
defective in a uniform way,43 or alternatively, all of the manufacturers must
38. Id; see generally GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS (1970) (describing loss distribution and harm minimization in the law of torts).
39. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 (emphasis added); see also Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150
P.2d 436, 440, 443 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J., concurring) (arguing that modem manufacturing trend
toward mass production requires strict liability).
40. Sindell, 607 P.2d at, 936-37; see also Cummins v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 495 A.2d
963, 971-72 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1985) (noting that the Sindell court mentioned fungibility in its policy
discussion of market share liability).
41. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
42. See id; Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37,49 (Wis. 1984) (devising Wisconsin's risk
contribution theory because "the interests of justice and fundamental fairness demand" it).
43. See Susan Rose-Ackerman, Market-Share Allocations in Tort Law: Strengths and Weaknesses,
19 J. LEGAL STUD. 739, 739 (1990) (noting that a fundamental requirement of market share liability is
that "[t]he products supplied by all producers are homogenous with respect to risk"); Rostron, supra
note 17, at 165 (describing how different manufacturers' DES products posed a uniform risk of harm
because they were "'identically defective,' with none being more or less dangerous than the rest");
Sheiner, supra note 5, at 994, 1002 (justifying so called "enterprise liability," but holding defendants
[Vol. 58: 115
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otherwise have engaged in uniformly tortious conduct." Uniformity of defect or of
tortious conduct is required because market share liability is justified by the notion
that between an innocent plaintiff and tortious defendants, the latter should bear the
cost of injury.45 Furthermore, all of the products must be uniformly defective
(defective in the same manner and to the same degree), or all of the manufacturers'
conduct must be uniformly tortious, because market share liability apportions
damages according to a manufacturer's share of the market.46 Such an
apportionment presupposes that either each individual product or each
manufacturer's conduct poses the same quantum of risk.47 Otherwise, a market
share apportionment of liability is unfair because it does not approximate the degree
to which each manufacturer contributed to the total risk of harm.48
The second foundational presumption of market share liability is that the
disputed products cannot be traced back to their original manufacturers.4 9 This
inability to trace is important because when market share liability is imposed, it is
possible-even likely-that a manufacturer will pay damages for injuries that it did
not actually inflict."0 This apparent unfairness is justified by the presumption that
an injured victim cannot identify the manufacturer whose tortious conduct, in fact,
liable on a market share basis because DES products are "identically defective"); see also Morris v.
Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1343 (C.D. Cal. 1987) (discussing how market share liability
required plaintiffs to show the defective product had "the same defect or combination of defects");
Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 (applying market share liability where the DES manufacturers "produced a drug
from an identical formula"); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069, 1075 (N.Y. 1989) (finding
market share liability appropriate because "the DES situation is a singular case with manufacturers
acting in a parallel manner to produce an identical, generically with marketed product"); Collins, 342
N.W.2d at 44 (noting that DES was "produced with a chemically identical formula").
44. See Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d 802, 829 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated, Hamilton v.
Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding that each of the handgun
manufacturers had negligently marketed handguns of the same caliber).
45. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936; Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075; Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 49.
46. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937 (Cal. 1980) (apportioning liability based on each defendant's local
market share); Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1078 (apportioning liability based on each defendant's national
market share). But see Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 49 (apportioning liability according to a defendant's
individual contribution to the total risk of harm). Rostron, as we have noted, would expand
"proportional liability" to encompass a broader array of cases in which proof of individualized causation
is not possible. See supra note 27.
47. Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 560-61 (Wis. 2005) (quoting Rostron, supra note 17, at
165).
48. See Rostron, supra note 17, at 165 (arguing that uniformity of risk is "what made market share
data the right measure to use to apportion liability").
49. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936; Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075; Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 49. But
see Sindell, 607 P.2d at 927 (noting that one plaintiff claimed she was able to identify the specific
manufacturer of the DES her mother took); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Mich. 1984)
(noting multiple plaintiffs identified specific manufacturers).
50. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937 ("[A] defendant may be held liable for a somewhat different
percentage of the damage than its share of the appropriate market would justify."); Hymowitz, 539
N.E.2d at 1074 ("[T]he chance that a particular [defendant] caused the injury is often very remote.")
(citing Sindell, 607 P.2d at 931); Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 49 (apportioning liability according to each
defendant's contribution to the "risk of injury" rather than the actual injuries each caused); Sheiner,
supra note 5, at 974 (describing how, under market share liability, a plaintiff only has to show there is
a "high probability" that one of the defendants caused the injury).
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caused her harm. Market share apportionment is thus the best available proxy for
cause-in-fact.
Many courts in the past identified goods that were either physically
indistinguishable, functionally interchangeable, or both as fungible.51 These are, in
fact, two of the three interpretations of fungibility adopted by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Thomas v. Mallet.52 Like Rostron, we conclude that, viewed from
the perspective of market share liability, the term fungibility really has only one
crucial meaning: uniformity of risk.53 Physical indistinguishability and functional
interchangeability, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's other interpretations of
fungibility, are critical factors in deciding when market share liability should apply
because goods that are physically indistinguishable and functionally
interchangeable tend to cause difficult and often impossible identification problems.
Accurately speaking, however, these two factors are not aspects of fungibility
viewed from the perspective of allocating liability among manufacturers. In our
view, fungibility, at least in the context of either market share liability or Rostron's
more inclusive proportional liability, should be understood only as describing
products that pose uniform risks. In this article, we sometimes use fungibility to
describe physical indistinguishability or functional interchangeability when the
courts have used the term in those ways. Ultimately, we conclude that the term
fungibility has outlived its usefulness as a proxy for the requirements that must be
satisfied for market share liability to apply, and we propose purposive rather than
definitional boundaries for the appropriate application of market share liability.
C. Judicial Capacity to Determine Market Shares
The third foundational presumption of market share liability relates to the
capacity of courts to determine each manufacturer's market share with a meaningful
degree of accuracy.54 This determination is important because a manufacturer's
market share is the proxy for the amount of risk its products posed.55 In Sindell, the
judicial determination of market shares was relatively easy.56 The victim's mother
obviously consumed the DES during an identifiable nine-month interval while she
was pregnant, making it feasible to ascertain, in a meaningful way, the market
shares of each DES manufacturer during this well-defined and relatively brief
period of time.
51. See infra Part V.A.1 (functional interchangeability) and Part V.A.2 (physical
indistinguishability).
52. 701 N.W.2d at 560.
53. Rostron, supra note 17, at 168.
54. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 937 ("It is probably impossible, with the passage of time, to determine
market share with mathematical exactitude .... [But] the difficulty of apportioning damages among
the defendant producers in exact relation to their market share does not seriously militate against the
rule we adopt.")
55. Id.
56. See id. (noting that the DES victims identified the five to six manufacturers that produced 90%
of the DES market).
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1ll. MARKET SHARE LIABILITY IN LITIGATION AGAINST LEAD PIGMENT
MANUFACTURERS
During the first quarter-century following Sindell, market share liability, for all
intents and purposes, was limited to DES cases. 7 Slightly more than one-third of
all states addressing the issue since Sindell have adopted or indicated they might
adopt market share liability where products are fungible." Plaintiffs' attorneys
frequently attempted to persuade courts to use market share liability in other
contexts, 59 but outside the DES context, courts applied the doctrine in merely a
handful of them.60 Initially, litigation against manufacturers of lead pigment was no
61exception.
A. Childhood Lead Poisoning
Approximately 310,000 American children under six years of age have
elevated blood lead levels in a range that poses a variety of health risks.62 The major
source of lead exposure among these children is lead paint and the dust generated
when lead paint deteriorates.6 3 Exposure to poorly maintained and deteriorated lead
paint can cause young children to develop various health problems, including
impaired cognitive function and hearing, behavioral difficulties, reduced stature,
57. Rostron, supra note 17, at 153; Aaron D. Twerski, Market Share-A Tale of Two Centuries,
55 BROOK. L. REV. 869, 875 (1989); Andrew B. Nance, Note, Market Share Liability: A Current
Assessment ofa Decade-Old Doctrine, 44 VAND. L. REV. 395, 397 (1991).
58. Rostron, supra note 17 at 170 n.103.
59. See supra note 12.
60. See supra note 13.
61. City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 129 (3rd Cir. 1993) ("We hold that
none of the theories advocated by plaintiffs-market share liability, alternative liability or enterprise
liability-may be invoked to impose liability on the lead pigment industry for the costs of lead-based
paint abatement."); see also Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 552 (1st Cir. 1993)
(dismissing the plaintiff's cause of action against lead paint manufacturers because "plaintiff's market
share and concert of action claims fail as a matter of law"); Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 930 F. Supp.
241, 247 (E.D. La. 1996), aff'd, 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (dismissing plaintiff's complaint and
refusing to adopt market share liability); Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 854 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1999) (holding market share liability was inapplicable against lead paint manufacturers);
Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169,173 (Pa. 1997) (declining to apply market share liability
in lead paint cases because to do so "would grotesquely distort liability" and make the determination
of culpability unfair). But see Jackson v. Glidden Co., 647 N.E.2d 879, 884 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995)
(reversing dismissal of the market share liability claim because the plaintiff's sufficiently "alleged that
lead paint and lead paint products are completely fungible, and that a substantial share of the lead paint
producers in the state are present in the suit").
62. NAT'L CTR. FOR ENVTL. HEALTH, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, DEP'T OF
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING (2005), http://www.cdc.gov/nceh/
publications/factsheets/ChildhoodLeadPoisoning.pdf.
63. Id Other sources include home health remedies such as arzacon and greta, some candies
imported from Mexico, imported toy jewelry, drinking water from pipes and pipe fixtures containing
lead, a parent's occupational exposure, and family members' hobbies that include working with lead.
Id.
11
Gifford and Pasicolan: Market Share Liability Beyond DES Cases: The Solution to the Caus
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
and, in extreme but now rare cases, death. 4 Federal law, however, has prohibited
the use of lead paint in the interior of residences since 1978.65 Furthermore, in 1955
the paint industry voluntarily agreed to limit the lead content in paint to no more
than 1% in total weight.66 More than 80% of the lead still remaining in residential
housing today was applied before 1940, and less than 4% was applied after 1960.67
Most cases of childhood lead poisoning arise in a small percentage of poorly
maintained residential properties.6 8 Children from low-income families, often
children of color, are disproportionately affected by lead poisoning.69
Residential property owners, states and municipalities, and the federal
government incur substantial costs in preventing and treating childhood lead
poisoning. More than 19 million housing units occupied in the United States in
1997 were constructed prior to 1940, most of which contain lead paint.7" Another
44 million units occupied in 1997 were built between 1940 and 1974, many of
which also contain lead paint. 7' The estimated cost of screening these pre-1960
units and implementing so-called "interim controls" that dramatically reduce the
likelihood of childhood lead poisoning is $1,000 per unit, and the cost of total
abatement or removal of lead paint is $9,000 per unit.72 Even applying the modest
interim control measures only to those most dangerous properties constructed
before 1940 yields an astronomical figure of more than $19 billion. This figure only
includes primary prevention costs and does not account for the costs of treating
already-existing victims, compensating victims for their personal damages
(including lost income), and educating the public about the dangers of childhood
64. See PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON ENVTL. HEALTH RISKS & SAFETY RISKS TO CHILDREN,
ELIMINATING CHILDHOOD LEAD POISONING: A FEDERAL STRATEGY TARGETING LEAD PAINT HAZARDS
1-2 (2000) [hereinafter PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE].
65. See 16 C.F.R. §§ 1303.1 (a)-(b), 1303.4(a) (2006) (banning "lead-containing paint" from
consumer use as a hazardous product) (originally promulgated at 42 Fed. Reg. 44,199 (Sept. 1, 1977));
see also Lead-Based Paint Poisoning Prevention Act, Pub. L. No. 91-695, § 401, 84 Stat. 2078, 2079
(1971) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4831 (2000)) (banning lead paint in federally-funded
programs).
66. AM. STANDARDS ASS'N, AMERICAN STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS TO MINIMIZE HAZARDS TO
CHILDREN FROM RESIDUAL SURFACE COATING MATERIALS 5 (1955) [hereinafter AM. STANDARD
SPECIFICATIONS] (Standard Z66.1-1955 § 2(a)) (listing members of the National Paint, Varnish, and
Lacquer Association as participants on the American Standards Association Committee on Hazards to
Children, which developed the specifications limiting lead content).
67. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 22 tbl.4.
68. See, e.g., Christy Darlene Plumer, Setting Priorities for Prevention of Childhood Lead
Poisoning in Providence 20 (May 2000) (unpublished M.A. thesis, Brown University) (on file with
Center for Environmental Studies, Brown University) ("[A]pproximately 60% of the poisoning events
occurred in approximately 2.5% (mean of the adjusted and unadjusted address figures) of [Providence,
Rhode Island's] residential properties.")
69. PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE, supra note 64, at 2 (reporting that "low-income and minority
children are much more likely to be exposed to lead hazards," and "16% of low-income children living
in older housing are poisoned, compared to 4.4% of all children").
70. Id. at app. A-10, tbl. 1I.
71. Id.
72. Id. at app. A-28, tbl.2. Both of these figures are quite conservative. Advocates for property
owners and many in the lead abatement business would argue that these figures are artificially low.
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lead poisoning. As a sad measure of the political will to address the problem, in
2000, a presidential task force recommended a federal budget of $164.5 million to
prevent childhood lead poisoning in 2001; however, the task force's
recommendations have been largely ignored.73
Costs of this magnitude have spurred individual victims, as well as states and
municipalities, to pursue legal actions against any private party that conceivably
might be held liable.74 For the individual victim of childhood lead poisoning, one
obvious target is the landlord whose negligence in allowing lead paint to deteriorate
was a proximate cause of the child's poisoning.75 Sometimes, however, the landlord
is judgment proof. In other circumstances, a landlord maybe shielded from liability
because some state statutes grant them immunity from common law liability after
they complete specified lead-hazard reduction treatments. 76 Finally, pollution-
exclusion provisions in a landlord's liability insurance contract may preclude
coverage and prevent the victim from recovering from the landlord's insurer.7 7 In
Thomas v. Mallett, the Wisconsin Supreme Court cited the victim's inability to
receive adequate compensation from the landlord or the landlord's insurer as a
reason for allowing the victim to proceed against lead pigment manufacturers.75
Recently, Rhode Island79 and a number of municipalities 8 also sued manufacturers
of lead paint or lead pigment in an attempt to recover the costs of preventing
childhood lead poisoning.
73. Id. at 9 (allocating approximately $120 million of the $164.5 million estimated budget for
primary prevention of lead hazards in residences). See generally OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET,
EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HISTORICAL TABLES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES
GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2003, at 265 tbl.12.3 (2002) (showing $86 million allocation in federal
budget for "[]ead housing reduction"in 2001).
74. See supra note 1 (discussing the nationwide surge of actions against former manufacturers
of lead paint beginning in 1999).
75. E.g., Brooks v. Lewin Realty III, Inc., 835 A.2d 616, 627 (Md. 2003) (holding the landlord
liable for the plaintiff's injuries from lead poisoning due to "the presence of flaking, loose, or peeling
paint" in violation of the Baltimore City Housing Code); Brown v. Dermer, 744 A.2d 47, 60-61 (Md.
2000) (holding the defendant landlord liable for the plaintiffs injuries due to "flaking paint that was
lead-based"); see also Ohio Jury Awards $100,000 to Lead-Poisoned Boy, MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.:
LEAD, Aug. 13,2003, at 11 (allowing plaintiff to recover from landlord for injuries caused by toxic lead
levels in rental property created by deteriorating lead paint and dust); $2M Verdict for Virginia Girl,
MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: LEAD, Apr. 16, 2003, at 4 (allowing a plaintiff to recover from a landlord for
lead poisioning caused by the negligence of the landlord's contractor).
76. E.g., WIS. STAT. § 254.173(2) (Supp. 2005) (granting immunity if, at the time the lead
exposure occurred, the dwelling was certified as lead free or lead safe); see also Thomas v. Mallett, 701
N.W.2d 523, 553 & n.34 (Wis. 2005) (applying statute).
77. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 552-53.
78. Id. For more detail regarding the Thomas court's decision to allow a plaintiff to recover under
Wisconsin's risk contribution theory, see infra Part IV.B.
79. In February 2006, a Rhode Island jury held lead pigment manufacturers liable to the State of
Rhode Island for potentially billions of dollars. Forelle, supra note 1, at D7.
80. See, e.g., County of Santa Clara v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 40 Cal. Rptr. 3d 313, 320, 348 (Ct.
App. 2006) (reversing trial court's dismissal of county's class action against several lead
manufacturers); City of Milwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888, 890, 897 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004)
(reversing the trial court's dismissal of the city's claims of public nuisance, conspiracy, and restitution
against lead paint manufacturers), petition for review dismissed, 703 N.W.2d 380 (Wis. 2005).
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B. Fungibility as Chemical Identity: Dismissal of Claims Because of
Inability to Prove Identity of Manufacturer
When victims of childhood lead poisoning sue manufacturers of lead paint or
lead pigment, they usually are unable to identify the specific manufacturer that
produced the harm-causing product.8' It is not difficult to see why, as the facts in
Skipworth v. LeadIndustries Ass 'n illustrate. In Skipworth, the guardians of a child
suffering from lead poisoning sued "substantially all of the manufacturers of lead
pigment," the presumed toxic ingredient in the paint applied to the child's house.82
The court emphasized the victim's inability to "identify any application, or
applications, of lead paint" that caused the child's health problems.83 Instead they
identified the period from the home's construction in 1870 to the time lead paint
was no longer available for residential use in 1977 as the relevant time frame.84 No
records were available to determine when the house had been painted, which paint
manufacturers' products were used, or which pigment manufacturers' products
were contained in any given paint.85 Additionally, none of the products had a
chemical signature that could identify any particular manufacturer's paint or
pigment.
8 6
Similarly situated plaintiffs have unsuccessfully attempted to hold
manufacturers of lead paint or lead pigment liable under market share liability,87
with the notable exception of the plaintiff in Thomas.88 The judicial rejection of
market share liability in these cases naturally flows from the policies behind the
theory.89 As we described above, market share liability presupposes that the
disputed products pose a uniform risk. 90 According to the court in Brenner v.
American Cyanamid Co.,9 this factor is not met in the lead paint context:
All DES manufactured had an identical chemical composition. In
contrast, lead-based paint is not a fungible product; it contains
81. See, e.g., Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 732 N.Y.S.2d 799, 800 (App. Div. 2001)
("[P]laintiffs admitted that they could not identify which defendant had manufactured the lead pigment
found in their residence."); Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169, 171 (Pa. 1997) ("Appellants
stipulated that they could not identify the manufacturer of the lead pigment which [the plaintiff]
ingested, and admitted that they could not identify when such pigment was made, sold, or applied to
her home.").
82. Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 171.
83. Id. at 172-73.
84. Id.
85. See id. at 171-73.
86. Id. at 173.
87. See supra note 61 (listing numerous cases in which courts have held market share liability
inapplicable in lead paint and pigment cases).
88. Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 562 (Wis. 2005).
89. See supra Part II.B.-C. (analyzing the three foundational presumptions underlying the doctrine
of market share liability).
90. See supra notes 42-48 and accompanying text (discussing that the products at issue must pose
a uniform risk if market share liability is to yield equitable results).
91. 699 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1999).
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varying amounts of lead pigments, including white lead
carbonate. Arguably, tile white lead carbonate used as a raw
material in some lead-based paint did not differ between
manufacturers. However, paint manufacturers used differing
armounts of white lead carbonate, or some other lead pigment, in
their paints. Some lead-based paint contained 10% lead pigment,
while other paint was more toxic, containing as much as 50% lead
pigment. Not only did the amount of lead pigment vary, but so did
the type of lead pigment used.92
The Skipworih court found that the lead pigment was the harm-causing product, not
the paint containing it.93 However, the court found the different compositions of the
product ultimately consumed-lead paint-affected the quantum of risk posed by
equivalent amounts of chemically identical lead pigment:
In contrast, it is undisputed that lead pigments had different
chemical formulations, contained different amounts of lead, and
differed in potential toxicity.
Appellants contend that "whether all of the lead pigment [the
pigment manufacturers] manufactured was exactly the same, in
every respect, [is] irrelevant .... " We do not see this problem
being so easily dismissed. Uncontested evidence shows that
differing forlmulae of lead paint result in differing levels of
bioavailability of the lead. Because of differences in
bioavailability, a child who ingests dust or chips of lead paint
containing equal amounts of lead "derived from two lead paints
will not generally develop equal elevation in internal lead level
from tile two paints. Rather, more highly bioavailable lead has a
greater impact than lead in less bioavailable form." Thus,
differing formulae of lead paint has a direct bearing on how much
damage a lead paint manufacturer's product would cause.94
The other requirement for the principled application of market share liability
is the ability of a court to determine the respective market shares of various
manufacturers, if not with absolute accuracy, then at least with a meaningful
approximation.9" Until Thomas, this requirement alone doomed the application of
92. Id. at 853.
93. 690 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. 1997).
94. Id. (footnote and citations omitted); accord Brenner, 699 N.Y.S.2d at 853 (determining the
various lead paints did not pose the same quantum ofrisk based on different paints containing "varying
amounts of lead pigments").
95. See supra Part II.C. (addressing the capacity of courts to accurately determine the respective
market shares of DES manufacturers); see also infra Part VI.C. (discussing the inability of courts to
accurately determine respective market shares of lead paint or lead pigment manu, facturers).
2006]
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market share liability in cases against manufacturers of lead paint or lead pigment. 96
Why is it impossible, as a practical matter, to determine market shares with a
reasonable degree of accuracy in the lead paint context? First, as the Skipworth
court noted, the paint that caused the harm may have been applied at any point
during "a more than one hundred year period from the date the house was built until
the lead paint ceased being sold for residential purposes." 97 It is one thing to
determine the manufacturers' respective market shares during a nine month period,
as in the DES context, but it is a far different proposition to determine market
shares during a period in excess of a century. Manufacturers of lead paint and lead
pigment entered the market, exited the market, re-entered, and perhaps re-exited the
market during this period. 9 Second, courts declining to apply market share liability
in the lead paint context have found that determining market shares of
manufacturers within any given period that occurred as long as 130 years ago may
be unrealistic, regardless of the duration of the period during which the products
were manufactured. 99 Neither plaintiffs nor defendants possess the necessary
records to determine the market shares of lead paint or lead pigment manufacturers
in 1880, 1900, or 1920.
IV. MARKET SHARE LIABILITY SHATTERS THE BARRIER OF CHEMICAL IDENTITY
At the dawn of the twenty-first century-a generation after Sindell-market
share liability remained a theory constrained by a narrow definition of fungibility
equated with chemical identity and largely limited to the DES context. The equities
in favor of plaintiffs, however, often are compelling. In the case of latent diseases
that arise years, even decades, after a victim is exposed to a product, it usually is
impossible for a victim to identify the manufacturer whose product caused the
harm. The court may find that the defendants acted tortiously when manufacturing
their products and the victim suffered from a harm caused by some manufacturer's
product. Still, unless the victim shows chemical identity among the products of
various manufacturers,' ° courts usually refuse to apply market share liability."° l
96. See, e.g., Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173 (recognizing "[tihe difficulty in applying market share
liability where such an expansive relevant time period as one hundred years is at issue").
97. Id.
98. See id.; accord Brenner v. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 852-53 (App. Div. 1999)
(concluding the court could not accurately determine each defendant's average market share for the
twenty-nine year period because "[d]uring that extended time period, some of the defendants entered
and left the white lead carbonate market").
99. See Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 551 (1st Cir. 1993); Jefferson v. Lead
Indus. Ass'n, 930 F. Supp. 241, 247 (E.D. La. 1996), aff'd, 106 F.3d 1245 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
Santiago, 3 F.3d at 550-52); Brenner, 699 N.Y.S.2d at 852-53; Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173.
100. See generally Morris v. Parke, Davis & Co., 667 F. Supp. 1332, 1341 (C.D. Cal. 1987)
(addressing the chemical similarities ofdiphtheria-pertussis-tetanus vaccines); In re MTBE Prods. Liab.
Litig., 75 F. Supp. 2d 593,621 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing plaintiffs' allegations that MTBE "'lack[ed]
characteristics or a chemical signature' that would enable identification of the refinery or company that
manufactured the product"); Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, II Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 111 (Ct. App.
1992) (discussing the compositional similarity of asbestos break pads); Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc.,
823 P.2d 717, 724 (Haw. 1991) (analyzing whether the human blood plasma product Factor VIII was
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Not even the compelling health crisis resulting from childhood lead poisoning
loosened the generally prohibitive prerequisites of market share liability.'12 Then,
beginning in 2004, scholars, courts, and legislatures reassessed market share
liability, a doctrine that had calcified during the previous generation.
A. Proportional Share Liability for Nonfungible Products
In 2004, Allen Rostron published an article' 3 that, even after only two years,
can convincingly be characterized as influential, if for no other reason than its
impact on the Wisconsin Supreme Court."° The court relied upon Rostron's
analytical framework in its seminal decision in Thomas v. Mallett, which extended
Wisconsin's variant of market share liability, known as "risk contribution theory,"
to litigation against lead pigment manufacturers.'0 5 Rostron criticized courts for
"tum[ing] fungibility into an instrument that can bar use of market share liability
in virtually any case."' 16 In its place, he proposed an alternative he labeled
"proportional share liability."'0 7 Under proportional share liability, courts might
begin with market share liability but then use "other available information to make
a reasonable allocation of liability that fairly reflects each defendant's contribution
to the risk and likelihood of having caused the harm.' 0 8 In the lead paint context,
for example, courts could use data showing the relative proportions of lead in each
manufacturer's paint to adjust their market share calculations to accurately reflect
the risk each manufacturer posed.'0 9 Lead content thus becomes the multiplier in a
weighted average formula.
1. Rostron's Analysis of Fungibility
What is most pertinent for our purposes is Rostron's untangling of the varying
ways in which courts have understood "fungibility" in the past. He categorizes three
such interpretations: (1) functional interchangeability, (2) physical
fungible based on compositional similarity).
101. See, e.g., Setliffv. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 769-70 (Ct. App.
1995) (dismissing plaintiff's action against the manufacturers of industrial adhesives and solvents
because plaintiffdid not identify a fungible agent common to all ofthe products); Bly v. Tri-Continental
Indus., Inc., 663 A.2d 1232, 1244 (D.C. 1995) (declining to apply market share liability to benzene
gasoline because the "record reveals that the formula can vary for the numerous sources of gasoline
products"); Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173 (finding the variations of the amount and type of lead pigment
in the lead paints undermined the plaintiff's market share liability claim).
102. See supra note 61.
103. Rostron, supra note 17, at 151.
104. Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523 passim (Wis. 2005).
105. Id. at 567.
106. Rostron, supra note 17, at 153.
107. Id. at 154.
108. Id.
109. See infra notes 114-22 and accompanying text (discussing Rostin's theoretical applications
of proportionate liability to nonfungible products).
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indistinguishability, and (3) uniformity of risk."' Rostron traces functional
interchangeability directly to the explicit language of Sindell v. Abbott
Laboratories, "'1 which described DES as a "drug interchangeable with other brands
of the same product."' 2 Rostron's second understanding of fungiblity, physical
indistinguishability, results from the identical or similar physical characteristics of
the products of various manufacturers, which make it difficult or impossible for
consumers or courts to tell them apart."
3
As Rostron correctly suggests, these first two definitions of fungibility are
actually second-order factors that determine whether "a product may pose unusually
severe identification problems.""' 4 In other words, a purposive restatement of a
single requirement for market share liability combining both functional
interchangeability and physical indistinguishability would be whether it is
impossible, as a practical matter, for a victim to trace the product causing his harm
back to its specific manufacturer.
Rostron regards the third definition of fungibility, uniformity of risk, as the key
to "traditional" market share liability, in contrast with his more flexible
proportional share liability." 5 After all, apportioning liability among the
manufacturers according to their unadjusted market shares is fair only if each
product poses a uniform risk of harm." 6
2. Rostron and Judicial Competency
The draft Restatement (Third) of Torts analyzes a theory it calls "risk-adjusted
market-share liability,""' which envisions something similar to Rostron's
proportional share liability. The Restatement concludes that "[w]hile in theory a
risk-adjusted market-share liability system might be attractive, the administrative
costs imposed even by a pure-market-share system augur against such efforts, and
there is virtually no case support for a risk-adjusted market-share theory.""' 8
Rostron is highly critical of the Restatement's reluctance to embrace risk-adjusted
market share liability. 19 He uses five examples to illustrate how the differences in
risk between non-quantifiable products can be quantified, thus making risk-adjusted
market share liability-proportional share liability-feasible.
Rostron first describes how risk-adjusted market share liability can apply to
cases involving defective vaccines for diphtheria-pertussis-tetanus (DPT)'20 because
110. Rostron, supra note 17, at 163-67.
111. 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980).
112. Id. at 926.
113. See Rostron, supra note 17, at 164-65 (discussing physical indistinguishability in the DES
context).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 165, 169.
116. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
117. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28(b) cmt. o (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
118. Id.
119. Rostron, supra note 17, at 173.
120. Id. at 174-80.
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the vaccine manufacturers record the incidence of injuries resulting from their
products. 121 A similar risk-adjustment is possible in cases involving asbestos brake
pads because the amount of asbestos in each pad can be quantified.121 In the
handgun context, adjusting for risk is a little trickier, but still possible. The federal
government's annual tracing of hundreds of thousands of guns used in crimes
provides a basis to allocate liability among gun manufacturers even when the
manufacturer of a gun used in a particular crime cannot be traced.123 Rostron's
fourth example is orbital space debris, which may collide with operational
spacecraft. 124 United States and Russian space surveillance systems can identify the
nations responsible for the largest pieces of debris; 15 the United States, for
example, produced just over 50% of total space debris in 1997.126 Thus, a court
could apportion damages resulting from unidentified debris based on a nation's
share of identifiable debris. 27 Lastly, in tobacco litigation, market share liability
can be risk adjusted because the government uses a uniform standard to measure
the amount of tar, nicotine, and carbon monoxide for almost every cigarette brand
in the United States. 1
28
Each of Rostron's examples, however, begins with meaningful market share
data that then can be adjusted to account for varying levels of risks. Most of his
examples involve products that were marketed (and in one case, launched)
relatively recently: vaccines, handguns, and space debris. However, none of these
examples mirror the complexity of determining the appropriate portions of liability
for nonfungible products that were produced and distributed decades ago but that
have caused latent diseases only recently. Rostron acknowledges the importance of
an identifiable time frame:
Plaintiffs seeking to recover on a theory of proportional share
liability also will continue to face significant and often
insurmountable hurdles if they cannot determine the approximate
time that the tortious conduct occurred. Although often
overlooked, one of the characteristics that made DES a
particularly appealing candidate for market share liability is that
it was relatively easy to determine the approximate time of
manufacture of the DES that caused each plaintiff's injuries. 2 9
121. Shackil v. Lederle Labs., 530 A.2d 1287, 1293-94 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987).
122. Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109, 111 (Ct. App. 1992); see also
Rostron, supra note 17, at 181-82 (discussing Wheeler court's reasoning).
123. Rostron, supra note 17, at 185-86.
124. ld. at 200-02.
125. Id. at 200. See generally Mark J. Sundahl, Note, Unidentified Orbital Debris: The Case for
a Market-Share Liability Regime, 24 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP. L. REv. 125, 132-33 (2000) (discussing
how the United States and Russia have tracked space debris since 1957).
126. See Sundahl, supra note 125, at 146.
127. Id. at 145-46.
128. Rostron, supra note 17, at 203-05.
129. Id. at 208.
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Ironically, given how the Wisconsin Supreme Court later used his analysis in
Thomas v. Mallet,3° Rostron explicitly rejects the application of proportional share
liability to cases against lead pigment manufacturers:
The timing of the tortious conduct is much more difficult to
determine for some other products and, as a result, proportional
share liability is much more difficult to apply. For example, the
First Circuit rejected market share liability claims against the
makers of lead paint pigments in Santiago v. Sherwin Williams
Co. on the ground that plaintiff could not identify the time of the
tortious conduct with sufficient specificity to allow a reasonable
allocation of liability to be made....
Recognizing that proportional share liability can be applied
to nonfungible products using information other than just market
share data would not necessarily help plaintiffs unable to
determine the timing of tortious conduct. For example, a
willingness to adjust market share data upward and downward to
account for variations in the lead content of different types of
paint will not change the fact that a plaintiff does not know the
time of the paint's manufacture and sale and therefore cannot
identify the approximate year or even decade from which to draw
the market share data in the first place. 3'
B. Risk Contribution Theory and Childhood Lead Poisoning
The Wisconsin Supreme Court's opinion in Thomas v. Mallett'32 broke new
ground in 2005 when it applied a variant of market share liability, which it called
"risk contribution theory," in essentially the same factual context that was present
in Skipworth. '33 The Thomas court allowed a victim of childhood lead poisoning to
proceed to trial against lead pigment manufacturers, even though the victim could
not identify the specific manufacturers that caused the harm. '34 Thomas blazes new
ground in tort causation by dramatically expanding the boundaries of market share
liability beyond DES cases. Thomas also extended the theory, for the first time, to
the rapidly emerging and socially important litigation against manufacturers of lead
130. See supra Part IV.A.1.
13 1. Rostron, supra note 17, at 209 (footnotes omitted).
132. 701 N.W.2d 523 (Wis. 2005).
133. Id. at 567.
134. As would be expected, the Thomas court justified its adoption of a market share-like
approach on instrumental grounds, primarily loss distribution. It recognized that, compared to the
plaintiff, the defendant-manufacturers were "in a better position to absorb the cost of the injury." Id. at
558. The court went on to explain that manufacturers "can insure themselves against liability, absorb
the damage award, or pass the cost along to the consuming public as a cost of doing business." Id. The
court also relied on both a loss-minimization rationale, i.e., "deterring knowingly wrongful conduct that
causes harm," and corrective justice principles. Id. at 558 & n.44.
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paint and lead pigment. Two aspects of the court's analysis facilitated the
application of a variant of market share liability to the lead paint context.
1. The Thomas Court Fudges Fungibility
Explicitly citing to and building upon Rostron's analysis, the Thomas court
eliminated any requirement of chemical identity among the various manufacturers'
products. 135 Indeed, the Wisconsin Supreme Court expressly held that "chemical
identity is not required" to establish the fungibility necessary for the risk
contribution theory to apply.'
36
"Fungibility," the Thomas court further observed, "is not a term that is capable
of being defined with categorical precision.""' Consequently, the court required
some unspecified combination of Rostron's three previously identified definitions:
whether the disputed products were (1) functionally interchangeable, 3 ' (2)
physically indistinguishable, 39 or (3) "identically defective."' 40 The Thomas court
failed to note that Rostron ultimately concluded that neither functional
interchangeability nor physical indistinguishability is necessary for market share
liability. 14 1 The court also did not explain whether a plaintiff invoking risk
contribution theory must meet all three definitions or whether the satisfaction of a
single interpretation suffices. Nor did the Thomas court provide any guidance for
how a court should weigh the multiple factors. Ultimately, the court implied that
whether a product is fungible is an issue of fact that should be left to a jury.42
2. Risk Contribution: An Even More Impossible Judicial Task
It is ironic that the Wisconsin Supreme Court extended its risk contribution
theory beyond DES cases given its reason for rejecting the "traditional" market
share liability pioneered in Sindell in favor of its own risk contribution theory, a
135. Id. at 560.
136. Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W. 2d 523, 560 (Wis. 2005).
137. Id. at 561; see also Rostron, supra note 17, at 168 (arguing for an understanding of
fungibility depending on "uniformity of risk").
138. For example, according to the Thomas court, various chemical compounds of white lead
carbonate, though not chemically identical, are functionally interchangeable because they were "lead
pigments... [that] provided the hiding power of paint." Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 561. The court reached
this conclusion despite having noted that a wide variety of functionally interchangeable paint pigments
existed that did not contain lead, including "lithopone, titanium dioxide, latex, water-based and alkyd
resin." Id. at 535 n.13.
139. Physical indistinguishability "is significant because it is... a reason why a product may pose
identification problems." Id. at 560.
140. Here the court opined that the lack of an identical chemical formula does not mean that each
manufacturer's product does not pose the same amount of risk as another manufacturer's product. Id.
at 560-61. The court emphasized that "it is the common denominator... that matters." Id. at 562.
141. Rostron, supra note 17, at 168.
142. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 560 n.47. In declining to decide whether lead pigment is a fungible
product, the court stated, "We do not resolve factual disputes." Id.
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variant of market share liability. In 1984, in Collins v. Eli Lilly Co.,143 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to adopt market share liability in the DES
context because it recognized the difficulty of determining even reasonable
approximations of each DES manufacturer's market share:
The primary factor which prevents us from following Sindell
is the practical difficulty of defining and proving market
share .... There are several reasons for this: The DES market
apparently was quite fluid, with companies entering and leaving
the market over the years; some companies no longer exist and
some that still exist may not have relevant records; and apparently
there are no accurate nationwide records pertaining to the overall
production and marketing of DES. We view defining the market
and apportioning market share as a near impossible task if it is to
be done fairly and accurately in order to approximate the
probability that a defendant caused the plaintiff's injuries. 44
Concerned with the practical impossibility of determining market shares in any
meaningful way, the court designed its risk contribution theory to determine various
manufacturers' respective shares of liability. Under the court's theory, a jury
assigns to each manufacturer the percentage of its financial responsibility for the
judgment.'45 To arrive at the percentage of responsibility, the jury should consider
not only the manufacturer's market share, but also its relative degree of fault and
the egregiousness of its conduct:
In assigning a percentage of liability to each defendant, the jury
may consider factors which include, but are not limited to, the
following: whether the drug company conducted tests on DES for
safety and efficacy in use for pregnancies; to what degree the
company took a role in gaining FDA approval of DES for use in
pregnancies; whether the company had a small or large market
share in the relevant area; whether the company took the lead or
merely followed the lead of others in producing or marketing
DES; whether the company issued warnings about the dangers of
DES; whether the company produced or marketed DES after it
knew or should have known of the possible hazards DES
presented to the public; and whether the company took any
affirmative steps to reduce the risk of injury to the public.'46
143. 342 N.W.2d 37 (Wis. 1984) (adopting risk contribution theory in Wisconsin for the first time
in an action against DES manufacturers).
144. Id. at 48.
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The Wisconsin Supreme Court's risk contribution theory is unlikely to resolve what
the court accurately identified as the inability of the judicial process to determine
each manufacturer's share of liability with a meaningful degree of accuracy. For the
same reasons described in Skipworth v. Lead Industries Association, 14 7 a risk
contribution analysis is far more daunting in the lead pigment and lead paint
context than in DES cases such as Collins. Under a risk contribution analysis, the
respective manufacturers' market shares, which the Collins court acknowledged
were impossible to determine accurately, remain one of the factors used to calculate
liability.148 To determine each defendant's market share in a lead pigment case such
as Thomas, the jury must consider interdependent factors including, but not limited
to, the timing of the various manufacturers' entry, exit, and sometimes re-entry into
the relevant market; what percentage of the plaintiffs exposure to lead pigment
occurred at each of the houses in which he lived; which years each of those houses
were painted and each manufacturer's share of the market during that time period;
and the possibility that lead pigments produced by various manufacturers were
absorbed into the victim's body at different rates (a fact disputed between the
parties). Once the jury determines the market share for each manufacturer, the jury
must weigh these determinations alongside factors bearing on the level of
egregiousness of each manufacturer's conduct; its knowledge of the product's
dangers or its negligence in this regard; whether it tested its product for safety; and
whether it "took the lead or merely followed others in producing or marketing" the
product. 49 It is difficult to see how combining "apples and oranges"-the
percentage of market share and the level of egregiousness of each defendant's
conduct-in any way makes the jury's calculation more manageable.
In sum, both by detaching the notion of fungibility from chemical identity and
including the consideration of factors that go to the level of egregiousness of the
defendants' conduct, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has made its variant of market
share liability less feasible, not more realistic. What the court has perhaps
accomplished, however, is to make it virtually impossible for an appellate court, the
legislature, the press, or commentators to say that any particular jury's
determination of the respective shares of liability was clearly wrong under the
multi-factor test of risk contribution theory.
V. THE UNDER- AND OVER-INCLUSIVENESS OF THE THOMAS DEFINITIONS
In his article, Rostron used a tripartite nomenclature to catalog previous judicial
definitions of fungibility 5 ° and argued that fungibility is not coextensive with
chemical identity.' 5' The Thomas court then adopted both Rostron's nomenclature
147. 690 A.2d 169, 172-73 (Pa. 1997) (describing the problems of an expansive time period and
differing levels of lead).
148. Collins, 342 N.W.2d at 48-49, 53.
149. Id. at 53.
150. Rostron, supra note 17, at 163-67; see supra Part IV.A.1 (addressing Rostron's three
categories of how courts have interpreted fungibility).
151. Rostron, supra note 17, at 168.
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and his argument that chemical identity was not required for market share
liability. 52 The Thomas court then applied each of the three understandings of
fungibility that Rostron derived from past judicial opinions,' 53 but without
acknowledging Rostron's conclusion that only one of the three understandings was
"crucial for market share liability."' 154
In this Part, we consider virtually all the previous market share liability cases
not involving DES to discover how other courts have understood fungibility. As
both Rostron and the Wisconsin Supreme Court observed, courts have understood
fungibility to be a requirement for market share liability and have interpreted this
requirement in one of three ways. 5 5 However, our analysis also reveals that any one
of the Thomas definitions, or any combination of these understandings, is under-
inclusive, over-inclusive, or both under- and over-inclusive, of the ideal universe
of market share liability cases in light of the original policies that justified the
creation of the doctrine. How a court defines fungibility is often outcome
determinative. A survey of products that have been held fungible by some courts
but not by others leads a cynical mind to suspect that judges apply the definition
that produces their desired result. A less sinister explanation is that any definition
of fungibility is indeterminate, and clever lawyering can exploit the malleability of
any or all of these definitions.
The limitations of the Thomas definitions are the subject of this Part; Section
A evaluates each individually, and Section B considers how they interact. In Part
VI, we suggest an alternative formulation for when market share liability should
apply, one that goes beyond mere cases involving chemical identity but remains
true to the theory's underlying policy justifications.
A. The Limitations of the Thomas Definitions
1. Functional Interchangeability
The first Thomas definition of fungibility, functional interchangeability, is
heavily context dependent. 56 The Thomas court explained the notion of context-
dependence by way of example: "[F]or signaling New Year's Eve, a blast from an
auto horn and one from a saxophone may be equivalent as noise, but few would
want to dance to the former."' 57 As this demonstrates, one probably could imagine
some context to make any two objects functionally interchangeable. Fortunately,
it seems that no court has been willing to fabricate an absurd context solely to hold
dissimilar products fungible. Courts have, however, defined fungibility in a
152. Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 559-61 (Wis. 2005).
153. Id. at 560-61.
154. Rostron, supra note 17, at 168.
155. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 561 (addressing Rostron's three categories of fungibility and
concluding that "fungibility, therefore, is not a term that is capable of being defined with categorical
precision").
156. Id. at 560.
157. Id. (quoting Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 32 F. Supp. 2d 47, 51 (E.D.N.Y. 1998)).
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functional interchangeability sense to downplay the fact that the disputed products
do not pose a uniform risk. Put differently, functional interchangeability is over-
inclusive when it groups manufacturers of defective products with manufacturers
of nondefective products or groups manufacturers of products that pose widely
varied levels of risk.
For example, Ray v. Cutter Laboratories'58 involved Factor VIII, a blood
protein that promotes clotting.159 Hemophiliacs take Factor VIII externally during
bleeding episodes because their own bodies lack sufficient quantities. 160 In Ray, the
plaintiff hemophiliacs allegedly contracted the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) from an unidentifiable batch of Factor VIII, and they sued the
manufacturers of the product under market share liability. 16' The Ray court held that
Factor VIII could be found to be fungible at trial, but the court first conceded that
there were fundamental differences between DES and Factor VIII. 62 Unlike DES,
which was made from a generic formula, 163 the composition of each batch of Factor
VIII depended on the pool of donors whose blood was included in that batch."6
More importantly, while DES was uniformly defective, 165 some batches of Factor
VIII were infected while others were not. 166 This distinction alone should have been
dispositive because market share liability is predicated upon the uniform risk posed
by products.'67 The Ray court nevertheless held that Factor VIII might be fungible
because "one manufacturer's Factor VIII product may essentially be used
interchangeably with another manufacturer's product."'
168
158. 754 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
159. See Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 721 (Haw. 1991).
160. Id.
161. Ray, 754 F. Supp. at 195.
162. Id. at 195-96.
163. E.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980) (finding that all DES was
manufactured from an identical formula).
164. Ray, 754 F. Supp. at 196.
165. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936.
166. Ray, 754 F. Supp. at 196.
167. See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text (addressing how the products must pose the
same quantum of risk for market share liability to fairly apportion liability based on the degree to which
each manufacturer contributed to the total risk of harm).
168. Ray, 754 F. Supp. at 196. Indeed, the Ray court found persuasive that Florida does not
specify any unique characteristics when it conducts bid invitations for "Antihemophilic Factor
Concentrates." Id. In George v. Housing Authority of New Orleans, the plaintiff also used a functional
interchangeability argument. 906 So. 2d 1282, 1287 (La. Ct. App. 2005). In George, an apartment
caught fire causing its residents (a mother and her three children) to evacuate. Id. at 1284. Regrettably,
one child died from fire-related complications and another was severely burned. Id. The mother
subsequently filed several suits, including one against smoke alarm manufacturers because her smoke
alarm did not go off. Id. Addressing the market share liability claim, the George court defined
fungibility as "commercially interchangeable with other property of the same kind" (i.e., functional
interchangeability). Id. at 1287 n. 1. The court then held that smoke alarms were not fungible because
"different smoke alarms by different manufacturers have different qualities." Id. at 1287. The court did
not explain what those different qualities were or how they precluded one smoke alarm from being
functionally interchangeable with another. The George court could not convincingly deny the
application of market share liability because it adopted an over-inclusive definition of fungibility.
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2. Physical Indistinguishability
Physical indistinguishability is the second Thomas definition of fungibility. 69
It is important because physically indistinguishable goods are difficult to trace back
to their original manufacturers. 7 ' Physical indistinguishability can be under- or
over-inclusive depending on the degree to which the definition requires that
products must be indistinguishable from one another. For instance, the Thomas
court held that lead pigments are not physically indistinguishable because
differences between them were "available only on the microscopic scale."'71 Lead
pigment, for example, came in three distinct chemical formulas.'72 The Thomas
definition of physical indistinguishability is arguably over-inclusive because it
would consider water and diluted hydrofluoric acid, a colorless, tasteless poison,
to be fungible. On the other hand, requiring physical indistinguishability on the
microscopic scale is equivalent to demanding chemical identity, something the
Thomas court refused to do because it would render fungibility under-inclusive. '73
Physical indistinguishability is under-inclusive for another reason:
considerations other than physical appearance may link a defective product to its
manufacturer. In Russo v. Material Handling Specialties Co.,174 the court
considered factors other than physical indistinguishability in determining whether
a product was traceable to its original manufacturer. 175 In that case, a flight
attendant was struck in the groin by an unsecured beverage cart. 76 As a result, he
had to undergo removal of his right testicle and sympathetic nerve blocks. 177 The
flight attendant sued the several manufacturers who supplied the beverage carts to
the airline. 178 Because he was unable to identify the manufacturer of the cart that
injured him, he relied on market share liability. 79 The Russo court imposed market
share liability because the carts were uniformly defective and could not be traced
back to their original manufacturers. 80 The carts were built from a generic design,
and individual manufacturers did not place any model or serial number on their
products.' 8 For all intents and purposes, the carts were physically indistinguishable.
Moreover, the court noted that the airline did not have a tracking system to identify
the manufacturer of a particular cart, which might have allowed the plaintiff to trace
the physically indistinguishable carts back to their original manufacturers.'82 The
169. Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 560 (Wis. 2005).
170. ld. at 560 (citing Rostron, supra note 17, at 165).
171. Id. at 561.
172. Id. at 559 & n.45.
173. Id. at 559-60.
174. No. 9101209, 1995 WL 1146853 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 29, 1995).
175. Id. 1995 WL 1146853, at *5.
176. ld. 1995 WL 1146853, at *1.
177. Id. 1995 WL 1146853, at *5.
178. Id. 1995 WL 1146853, at *1.
179. Id. 1995 WL 1146853, at *3.
180. Id. 1995 WL 1146853, at *6-7.
181. Id. 1995 WL 1146853, at *3.
182. Id. 1995 WL 1146853, at *5.
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Russo court correctly recognized that considerations other than physical
appearance, such as pattern of use, may link a defective product to its manufacturer.
The federal district court for the Southern District of New York applied similar
reasoning in In re Methyl Tertiary Butyl Ether ("MTBE') Products Liability
Litigation.'83 In that case, well owners brought a class action against petroleum
manufacturers for allegedly polluting their groundwater with MTBE.'1 4 MTBE is
a highly soluble gasoline additive that contaminates water faster and more
pervasively than other gasoline components.'85 MTBE also is recognized by the
government as a possible human carcinogen. "Every year over nine million gallons
of gasoline with MTBE escape into the environment during transportation, storage,
sale, or use in the United States."' 8 6 The In re MTBE court addressed many issues,
including whether market share liability could be invoked by well owners from
states that recognized the theory. 187 The court held that the well owners sufficiently
alleged MTBE was fungible, given its chemical nature and how it was sold, to
survive dismissal under New York, California, and Florida law.' 88 The court noted
that the plaintiffs alleged MTBE lacked a "chemical signature" unique to a
particular manufacturer. 189 Moreover, the plaintiffs further alleged that because
MTBE is more water-soluble than other gasoline components, wells contaminated
with MTBE showed little or no traces of other additives that could identify the
manufacturer responsible for the contamination. 90 Additionally, the plaintiffs
alleged petroleum manufacturers traded MTBE amongst each other, making
identification even more indeterminable. 9' The court's finding that plaintiffs'
allegations sufficed to survive dismissal raises two important points. First, although
different manufacturers' MTBE may be physically indistinguishable from one
another, other gasoline components may help identify a specific manufacturer.
Second, the petroleum manufacturers' practice of trading MTBE, which had no
bearing on physical indistinguishability, contributed to the identification problem.
The In re MTBE court implicitly recognized that fungibility in the physical
indistinguishability sense is under-inclusive, leading it to examine other factors to
determine whether a specific manufacturer could be linked to the contamination of
particular wells.
183. 175 F. Supp. 2d 593 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
184. Id. at 598-99.
185. Id. at 599.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 619-20 (citations omitted). The plaintiff class consisted of citizens of California,
Florida, Illinois, and New York; only Illinois had declined to adopt market share liability. Id. at 620-23.
188. See id at 621-22.
189. Id. at 621.
190. See id at 599, 621.
191. Id. at 621.
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3. Uniformity of Risk
Under the third Thomas definition of fungibility, a product is fungible if one
manufacturer's product poses the same risk of harm as another's.' 92 Fungibility in
the uniformity-of-risk sense, standing alone, is more over-inclusive than the other
definitions because dissimilar products may pose a uniform risk of harm. Consider
the following two cases. In McGuinness v. Wakefern Corp.,'93 several members of
a family developed salmonella type "D" food poisoning after eating home-cooked
lasagna.'94 The lasagna was made from eggs, noodles, mozzarella cheese, ricotta
cheese, and pasta sauce, so the family sued the manufacturer of each ingredient
under market share liability.'95 The theory presumably applied because the family
did not know which ingredient was contaminated with the salmonella bacteria, so
the chance of any particular ingredient causing the food poisoning was identical.
An analogy may be helpful: in Russian roulette, only the gun chamber with the
bullet poses a risk of harm; the other five are harmless. Not knowing which one has
the bullet, however, makes each pull of the trigger pose the same risk of harm.
The McGuinness court ultimately chose not to impose market share liability
because the manufacturers made "dissimilar products."' 196 The court did not define
fungibility or explain how the lasagna ingredients were dissimilar probably because
the products were obviously neither functionally interchangeable nor physically
indistinguishable. 97 Additionally, the ingredients were not proven to be uniformly
defective; the plaintiffs did not show that every ingredient had salmonella. What
they did show, ironically, was that each ingredient could have posed a uniform risk
of harm.
Like the McGuiness family, the plaintiff in Setliff v. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours
& Co. 19' sought to define fungibility in a uniformity of risk sense. 199 In that case,
the employee of a paint store alleged that he sustained vital organ damage and
nerve damage causing psychological injuries due to prolonged exposure to paint
and solvent fumes.200 The employee sued some forty manufacturers of paint,
solvents, strippers, and glue under market share liability,' alleging that "the
products possessed 'common toxic chemical ingredients." 2 2 The Setliffcourt did
not apply market share liability because even the employee conceded that it was not
clear that there was a "'fungible' agent common to all the products.""2 3 Again, the
192. Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 560-61 (Wis. 2005).
193. 608 A.2d 447 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991).
194. Id. at 448.
195. Id.
196. Id. at 449.
197. Indeed, the plaintiffs traced each ingredient back to its original manufacturer. Id. at 448.
198. 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763 (Ct. App. 1995).
199. Id. at 765.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 765.
202. Id. at 769.
203. Id. at 769-70.
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employee reasonably argued that fumes from one or all of the paints and solvents
could have caused his injury; therefore, each posed the same quantum of risk.
Even when used to analyze similar products, defining fungibility in the
uniformity of risk sense tends to be over-inclusive because it may group
manufacturers of defective products with manufacturers of nondefective products.
Ray v. CutterLaboratories,2° for example, involved batches of Factor VIII infected
with AIDS. The Ray court recognized that some batches of Factor VIII were
defective while others were not.2°5 One would assume, therefore, that Factor VIII
was not fungible in the uniformity of risk sense because defective batches posed a
risk of harm while nondefective batches did not. The Ray court, however, reasoned
differently. Defective batches of Factor VIII were infected with AIDS because at
that time, there was no formal process to screen blood donors for the disease.20 6
Thus, the probability that any given batch was infected with AIDS was the same
(the Russian roulette rationale).
The Ray court's uniformity of risk definition of fungibility is over-inclusive
because a manufacturer of a nondefective product may be held liable for the injuries
caused by the manufacturer of a defective product. This result exceeds the scope of
market share liability in Sindell because there, the DES manufacturers were held
liable to the extent they either caused injury-in-fact or contributed to the risk of
harm. Under Ray, a manufacturer that neither caused injury-in-fact nor contributed
to the risk of harm could be held liable.20 7
Fungibility in the uniformity of risk sense may be under- or over-inclusive in
another respect. Courts sometimes determine fungibility based on the variance in
toxicity levels between products. Products with significantly varying toxicity levels
do not pose a uniform risk of harm and hence, are not fungible. Products with
toxicity levels that vary within a limited range pose a relatively uniform risk of
harm and hence are fungible. The Thomas court provided the most reasoned
explanation for the distinction: "[W]hether a product poses a uniform risk can
depend on the choice of the unit for which risk is measured. 2 8 For example,
"'[w]hile each milligram of DES presented the same amount of risk, each DES pill
did not, because the pills came in different dosages.' 2 9 The Thomas court further
explained that while "products may contain different concentrations of the
hazardous substance, there is leeway to conclude that strict chemical uniformity
does not render all substances fungible."'21 Lead paint pigment is fungible in the
uniformity of risk sense presumably because the lead concentration levels of the
204. 754 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
205. Id. at 196.
206. Id.
207. See id. at 195-96.
208. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d 523, 561 (Wis. 2005) (quoting Rostron, supra note 17, at 166).
209. Id. (quoting Rostron, supra note 17, at 166).
210. Id. (citing Rostron, supra note 17, at 166-67).
2006]
29
Gifford and Pasicolan: Market Share Liability Beyond DES Cases: The Solution to the Caus
Published by Scholar Commons,
SOUTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
different pigments varied within a limited range.2 1 1 The Thomas court did not,
however, quantify what level of variance is dispositive of fungibility. Thus,
fungibility in the uniformity of risk sense can be under-inclusive if a court requires,
say, zero variance (i.e., chemical identity) or over-inclusive if a court only requires
a common toxin.2"2 The latter scenario is what the Thomas dissent accused the
majority of doing.2 13
Different courts have found different levels of variance dispositive of
flingibility. One court, for instance, held that a difference in the amount of a toxic
ingredient contained in a product of between 0% and 5% precluded a finding of
fungibility, while another court ruled that a difference of 20% was indicative of
fungibility. In Bly v. Tri-Continental Industries, Inc.,214 two auto mechanics died
of leukemia, allegedly resulting from long-term exposure to gasoline containing
benzene.215 Their estates subsequently sued several gasoline manufacturers and
suppliers, claiming the defendants were liable under market share liability.216 The
District of Columbia Court of Appeals held that the facts in Bly did not justify the
adoption of market share liability.217 The court reasoned that gasoline containing
benzene was not fungible because it was not produced according to a single
formula, and the benzene content of different manufacturers varied between 0%
and 5%.2"8
In Wheeler v. Raybestos-Manhattan,"9 the court held that asbestos brake pads
were fungible enough to establish "the prima facie elements of a case for market
share liability."22 To do so, the court defined fungibility in a functional
interchangeability sense, but also evaluated both physical indistinguishability and
the uniformity of risk.2 12 The court conceded that "from the standpoint of an auto
mechanic," the brake pads were not functionally interchangeable because different
automobiles needed brake pads of varying shapes and sizes.222 For that same reason,
the court also recognized that the brake pads were not physically
indistinguishable. 23 The Wheeler court nevertheless concluded that the brake pads
may be fungible because they all contained a single type of asbestos fiber,
211. Contra id. at 584 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (arguing that lead paints and pigments were not
identical due to the lack of uniform manufacturing formula, which resulted in "different levels of
toxicity").
212. E.g., id. at 562 (majority opinion) (finding white lead carbonates fungible because the lead
"was the common denominator in the various white lead carbonate formulas").
213. Id. at 585 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
214. 663 A.2d 1232 (D.C. 1995).
215. Id. at 1234.
216. Id. at 1236-37.
217. Id. at 1245.
218. Id. at 1244 & n.9.
219. 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d 109 (Ct. App. 1992).
220. Id. at 113 (mentioning Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 294, 936 (Cal. 1980)).
221. Id. at Ill ("Webster's defines fungible as '[o]f such a kind or nature that one specimen or
part may be used in place of another specimen or equal part in the satisfaction of an obligation' or
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chrysotile.224 Moreover, the amount of chrysotile in the brake pads varied within a
limited range of 40% to 60% of each pad's weight. '2 5 The court determined this
range demonstrated that "the risk of harm posed by the products of each
manufacturer is more nearly equivalent. 226 In short, the brake pads posed a
relatively uniform risk of harm because the asbestos levels differed by only 20%.
The Wheeler court's reasoning that a toxicity difference of 20% evinces fungibility
is inconsistent with the Bly court's reasoning that a 5% difference precludes
fungibility. 227 Of course, benzene may be so much more toxic than asbestos that a
5% difference in the amount of toxicity of the former poses significantly greater
risks than a 20% difference in the amount of toxicity of the latter. That said, the
results of Bly and Wheeler appear inconsistent.
In short, long before Rostron first used the terms functional interchangeability,
physical indistinguishability, and uniformity of risk, and before the Wisconsin
Supreme Court ratified this nomenclature, courts functionally had used the three
concepts in deciding whether to apply market share liability. The Thomas court was
unclear about whether market share liability was justified by the presence of a
single definition, whether all three definitions were required, or whether market
share analysis depended upon a multi-factor balancing test.
Our analysis has shown that the use of any single definition, either in isolation
from other definitions or as the overwhelmingly predominant definition, yields
results that are incongruent with the policies underlying market share liability. Yet
requiring that all three definitions be met is practically equivalent to demanding
chemical identity. Most products that simultaneously are functionally
interchangeable, physically indistinguishable, and uniformly risky are chemically
identical. The next Section considers the viability and desirability of the
intermediate approach, that is, using each of the three definitions as factors in a
multi-factor balancing test.
B. The Inconsistency of Multi-Factor Balancing Tests
The Thomas court recognized the limitations in each of its three definitions of
fungibility.22 8 Indeed, the court presumably offered three definitions, rather than just
one, to mitigate the subjectivity of any single definition. 2 9 This use of three
definitions assumes that the interaction between the definitions minimizes the
potential subjectivity inherent in any single factor, arguably because the under-
224. Id.
225. Id. at 109.
226. Id. at 111-12.
227. Compare Bly v. Tri-Continental Indus., Inc., 663 A.2d 1232, 1244 n.9 (D.C. 1995)
(concluding a difference of 5% in the amount of benzene the products contained precluded finding the
products fungible), with Wheeler, 11 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 111 (concluding a difference of 20% in the amount
of asbestos the products contained did not preclude finding the products fungible).
228. Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 561-62 (Wis. 2005).
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inclusiveness of one definition will compensate for the over-inclusiveness of
another. However, several definitions of a single term, much like a multi-factor test,
may equally be subject to inconsistent judicial treatment reflecting judicial bias.23 °
Courts may, for instance, give one definition more weight than another to arrive at
a predetermined outcome. Room for play in the joints of a multi-factor test for
fungibility can be seen when two courts assess the fungibility of the same product
and reach opposite conclusions. A side-by-side comparison of these differing
rationales reveals that the courts' conclusions depended on the definition of
fungibility used or the significance placed on one definition over another. A brief
examination of the fungibility of handguns, lead pigment, and Factor VIII is
illustrative.
1. Handguns
In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek,23" ' handgun victims sued handgun manufacturers for
negligent marketing and distributing of firearms in a manner that made handguns
more easily accessible to careless youths and violent criminals.232 Judge Jack
Weinstein held the manufacturers liable under market share liability because he
found the theory was meant to address the societal harms posed by products like
handguns.233 He observed that it is nearly impossible for a victim to identify the
manufacturer of the handgun that caused the injury because most "crime guns" are
never recovered. 234 A ballistics analysis of recovered shell casings may eliminate
possible manufacturers, but usually cannot identify a specific one.235 Judge
Weinstein further reasoned that principles of loss distribution and loss minimization
counsel for application of market share liability.236 He concluded that handguns
were fungible in a functional interchangeability sense.237 Judge Weinstein noted,
"From the point of view of criminals using them, there are no relevant differences
between handguns. 23 8 Indeed,"[t]he fungibility of handguns... is even clearer
when viewed from the vantage point of shooting victims.
23 9
230. See Carlos E. Gonzilez, The Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing Combination of
Formalism andAnti-Formalism in Adjudication of Conflicting Legal Norms, 80 OR. L. REv. 447,576
(2001) ("Courts can always manipulate the weight assigned to one or two factors in a balancing test...
in order to avoid or select a problematic or desired substantive outcome."), Herma Hill Kay, Chief
Justice Traynor and Choice ofLaw Theory, 35 HASTINGS L.J. 747,795 (1984) ("[M]ulti-factor rules...
lend themselves to manipulation and to the incorporation of contradictory approaches.").
231. 62 F. Supp. 2d 802 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated, Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F.
Supp. 2d 882 (2nd Cir. 2001).
232. Id. at 808.
233. See id. at 841-43.
234. Id. at 843.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 843-44.
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The New York Court of Appeals, on a certified question, disagreed with Judge
Weinstein and held that handgun victims could not assert market share liability.
240
To do so, the New York court first distinguished DES from handguns.24" ' The court
observed that DES was an "identical, generically marketed product," while
242handguns were not. The court emphasized "it [was] often possible to identify the
caliber and manufacturer of the handgun that caused injury to a particular
plaintiff. ' 243 The court also rejected the argument that the manufacturers' marketing
and distribution practices proximately caused the societal harm. 2' After all, the
plaintiffs never asserted that the handgun manufacturers' marketing and distribution
practices were uniform. 245 This lack of uniformity was crucial because "[e]ach
manufacturer engaged in different marketing activities that allegedly contributed
to the illegal handgun market in different ways and to different extents. 246 In this
situation, therefore, "a manufacturer's share of the national market does not
necessarily correspond to the amount of risk created by its alleged tortious
conduct. 24 7
These two decisions, based on the same facts, demonstrate that different
definitions of fungibility may produce different outcomes. To show that handguns
were fungible, Judge Weinstein framed functional interchangeability in the broadest
possible context: all criminals use handguns for the same purpose.248 In contrast, the
New York Court of Appeals evaluated the functionality of handguns in a narrower
context: handguns are not fungible because they are not identical; different
handguns have different features. 249 Regarding traceability, Judge Weinstein
reasoned that it is impracticable to link an injured victim to a specific handgun
manufacturer.25" The court of appeals, however, reasoned that it is not impossible
to identify the manufacturer of the handgun that caused a particular injury.25'
Observe the subtle difference between impracticability and impossibility. The court
of appeals noted that it is possible to link a particular injury to a specific
manufacturer if both the gun and bullet are recovered. 2 But as Judge Weinstein
240. Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 750 N.E.2d 1055 (N.Y. 2001).
241. Id. at 1067 (citing Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly Co. 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989)).
242. Id.
243. Id. (footnote omitted).
244. Id.; see also Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 808 (noting that the plaintiffs sought
to recover in negligence based on "the manufacturers' indiscriminate marketing and distribution
practices").
245. Beretta, 750 N.E.2d at 1067.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 844.
249. Beretta, 750 N.E.2d at 1067; see also George v. Housing Auth. of New Orleans, 906 So. 2d
1282, 1287 (La. Ct. App. 2005) ("Since different smoke alarms by different manufacturers have
different qualities, they cannot be deemed fungible."); supra Part V.A.2 (discussing the Thomas
definition of fungible as requiring the products be physical indistinguishable).
250. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 843.
251. Beretta, 750 N.E.2d at 1067.
252. Accu-Tek, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
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keenly observed, crime guns rarely are recovered.253 The court of appeals used an
impossibility standard of traceability to conclude that handguns are not fungible,
while Judge Weinstein used an impracticability standard to conclude that they are
fungible. Regarding the uniformity of risk, Judge Weinstein asserted that each
individual handgun poses the same quantum of risk because they are used for the
same purpose.254 The court of appeals reasoned that the lack of uniform marketing
practices differentiates each manufacturer's contribution to the total risk of harm.2"
Judge Weinstein used the inherent nature of handguns to determine the quantum of
risk, while the court of appeals examined how handguns are marketed and
distributed.
2. Lead Pigment
As detailed above, the Thomas court held that lead pigment is fungible. 6 To
do so, the Thomas court first noted that lead pigments, and indeed any pigments
used in paint, are functionally interchangeable because they are one of two
necessary components of paint.257 The Thomas court determined lead paint
pigments are physically indistinguishable because they can only be differentiated
on the microscopic scale .25 Regarding the uniformity of risk, the court determined
lead paint pigments pose the same quantum of risk because they contain a common
toxic element, lead, the concentration of which varies within a limited range. 9
In contrast, a New York court in Brenner v. American Cyanamid Co. 26" held
that lead pigment was not fungible. The court did not consider fungibility in the
functional interchangeability sense, but it did find that lead pigments are not
physically indistinguishable because different manufacturers used different types
of2pigments. Unlike Thomas, the court in Brenner differentiated the pigments on
the microscopic level.262 Regarding the uniformity of risk, the Brenner court
observed that the amount of lead pigment in different manufacturers' paints varied
from 10% to 50%, and therefore "the finished product that was used by consumers
here, i.e., lead-based paint, was not fungible. ' '263 The court in Brenner concluded
253. Id. at 843.
254. Id. at 844.
255. Beretta, 750 N.E.2d at 1067.
256. See supra Part IV.B (discussing how the Thomas court extended market share liability into
the context of lead paint).
257. Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 561 (Wis. 2005) (noting that paint requires a pigment
and a vehicle).
258. Id.
259. Id. at 562.
260. 699 N.Y.S.2d 848 (App. Div. 1999).
261. Id at 853.
262. Compare id. (finding lead paint was not fungible because different types of paint had varying
levels of toxicity based on manufacturers using different amounts and types of lead pigments), with
Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 561 (finding lead pigment and lead paint fungible because all of those products
contain white lead carbonates); see also In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, 621
(S.D.N.Y. 2001) (examining the "chemical signature" of MTBE to determine fungibility).
263. Brenner, 699 N.Y.S.2d at 853.
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that the different manufacturers' lead pigments did not pose a uniform risk of
hann.2 6 Similarly, in Skipworth,265 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the
different chemical formulations of lead pigment resulted in different risks to
children because some lead pigment was more easily internalized by the body than
other chemical formulations. 66
3. Factor VIII
In Ray v. Cutter Laboratories,26 7 the court held that Factor VIII may be
fungible.265 Under a functional interchangeability analysis, the court reasoned that
all Factor VIII serves the same purpose regardless of the different donors and
methods used to make each batch. 269 The court also considered the uniformity of
risk factor and noted that while only some batches of Factor VIII were infected with
AIDS, there was an equal probability that any given batch was infected because
none of the manufacturers screened for AIDS.
270
In contrast, in Doe v. Cutter Biological,27 ' the court held that Factor VIII was
not fungible.272  The court observed, under an analysis of physical
indistinguishability, that each manufacturer's product "'is clearly distinguishable
by brand name, package color, lot number, and number of units of Factor VIII per
vial." 273 Indeed, the Doe court added, "it would have been possible-had plaintiff
kept such records-to identify the [specific manufacturer]. 2 74 The court also
reasoned that Factor VIII did not pose a uniform risk of harm because only some
batches were infected with the HIV virus.275
The Ray court used a functional interchangeability argument while the Doe
court did not, but the Doe court used a traceability argument while the Ray court
did not. This difference may be because functional interchangeability,
contextualized broadly, tends to be over-inclusive; while physical
indistinguishability, under an impossibility standard, tends to be under-inclusive.
Both courts used fungibility in the uniformity-of-risk sense in different ways. The
Ray court looked at the entire supply of Factor VIII and correctly determined that
each batch had the same chance of being contaminated with the HIV virus as any
other batch. The Doe court compared the contaminated batches with the
264. Id. Recall, this lack of a uniform risk of harm also was the thrust of Justice Wilcox's
dissenting opinion in Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d at 584 (Wilcox, J., dissenting).
265. Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 690 A.2d 169, 173 (Pa. 1997).
266. See id. at 173.
267. 754 F. Supp. 193 (M.D. Fla. 1991).
268. Id. at 196.
269. Id.
270. Id.
271. 852 F. Supp. 909 (D. Idaho 1994).
272. Id. at 913.
273. Id. (quoting Smith v. Cutter Biological, Inc., 823 P.2d 717, 733 (Haw. 1991) (Moon, J.,
dissenting)).
274. Id.
275. Id. at 913.
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uncontaminated ones and concluded that the former posed greater risks than the
latter.
VI. A PURPOSIVE RESTATEMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR MARKET SHARE
LIABILITY
The Thomas court's attempt to define fungibility was long overdue, but it
should be considered a starting point rather than the apodictic standard governing
the proper application of market share liability. One way to improve the Thomas
definitions would be to align them with the policies behind market share liability.
The boundaries within which market share liability can operate should be defined
purposively, rather than linguistically, on the basis of an understanding of
"fungibility." The use of the term itself should be restricted to whether a product
poses a uniform risk as we argue in Section A.
Should market share liability ultimately apply, the plaintiff is relieved from
proving the most basic requirement of traditional tort law, cause in fact, which is
proving that a specific tortfeasor caused the harm. Therefore, application of market
share liability should be limited to situations also satisfying two other requirements.
First, it must be impossible, as a practical matter, for the victim to trace his injury
to the product of a particular manufacturer, as we discuss in Section B. Though this
is not, strictly speaking, a matter of fungibility, two of the Thomas court's
understandings of fungibility, physical indistinguishability and functional
interchangeability, strongly suggest the victim's inability to trace the causal
connection back to a specific manufacturer. Second, for market share liability to
apply, a court must be able to determine each manufacturer's market share, with at
least a reasonable degree of approximation. If courts cannot make such an
approximation, the plaintiff should not be allowed to recover under market share
liability. Section C describes the court's obligation to decide whether market shares
can be determined in a meaningful manner.
Under our proposal, each of the requirements outlined in this Part must be
satisfied for market share liability to apply. Unlike the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
opinion in Thomas, there is no ambiguity in our proposal. Merely satisfying one of
the factors is not enough. Nor does this proposal call for a balancing test. Finally,
the court, not the jury, determines whether the requirements are satisfied as a matter
of law.
A. Uniform Products Must Pose Risk in a Uniform Manner and to a Uniform
Degree
It is easy to understand why courts have used some variant of a uniformity of
risk standard to analyze market share liability cases.276 If products pose a uniform
276. See, e.g., supra Part V.A.3 (noting that courts can determine whether a product is fungible
by determining whether the products have the same quantum of risk).
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risk, then each manufacturer's share of distribution of that product neatly
approximates the harm the manufacturer caused.277
The problems that result from such a standard, if it is either employed by itself
or not carefully articulated, may be less obvious. As one paradigmatic example, the
McGuiness family could not identify which lasagna ingredient was contaminated
with salmonella, so they argued that each ingredient posed a uniform risk in the
hopes of triggering market share liability. 278 The uniformity of risk factor really
consists of three separate elements: (1) uniformity of product identity, (2)
uniformity of either product defectiveness or the manufacturer's other tortious
conduct, and (3) uniformity in degree of risk.
1. Uniformity of Product Identity
Under the first element, the disputed products must be, in a common sense
manner, identical. Even if multiple ingredients in household cleaning agents may
cause harmful health effects, courts should not join in a single action the
manufacturers of these different agents.279 Nor should courts apply market share
liability against the manufacturers of the lasagna ingredients.28 °
In reality, the reasons for requiring product identity bear more upon the factors
of untraceability and the judicial determination of market shares, discussed in
Sections B and C, than they do upon any requirement that products pose equivalent
risks. First, as previously discussed,28" ' market share liability is not justified for
actions involving manufacturers of traceable products. Products that are not
identical are more easily traceable to their manufacturer than are identical products.
Second, and more importantly, it is conceptually meaningless for a court to
determine the market shares of products that are not identical. What is the point of
determining the respective market shares of the manufacturers of two different
products, say cheese and noodles, when the manufacturers of these products are not
even in the same market? Finally, because market share liability is a rare exception
to the requirement that a plaintiff prove the identity of the tortfeasor that caused the
harm, it seems reasonable to restrict the application of the doctrine to situations
involving essentially identical products.
277. Rostron also may be correct that even if products do not pose uniform risks, it may be
possible, at least theoretically, to adjust each manufacturer's market share to reflect differing degrees
of risk. Rostron, see supra note 17, at 168-73. However, this additional step adds to the complexity of
determining each manufacturer's share and often will exceed the court's competence.
278. McGuinness v. Wakefern Corp., 608 A.2d 447, 448 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991); see supra notes
192-96 and accompanying text.
279. See Setliffv. E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 763, 768-70 (Ct. App. 1995)
(declining to impose market share liability to manufacturers of paints, glues, and solvents).
280. See McGuinness, 608 A.2d at 448-49.
281. See supra Part V.A.2.
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2. Uniformity of Product Defectiveness or Other Tortious Conduct
For market share liability to apply, the plaintiff should be required to prove that
each manufacturer's product is defective in a uniform way or that each
manufacturer's conduct was otherwise tortious in a uniform way. Again, in the
lasagna case, it is highly probable that only one of the ingredients was, in fact,
contaminated with salmonella; therefore, the application of market share liability
would have been inappropriate.2"2 Sindell itself also required the plaintiff prove
that each of the manufacturers engaged in tortious conduct.283 The loss
minimization rationale thatjustifies market share liability284 makes sense only if all
of the manufacturers are engaged in tortious conduct, not if only one or some of the
possible defendants have acted tortiously.
Not only must each manufacturer's conduct be tortious, the conduct must be
tortious in an identical way.285 Consider an action seeking to impose market share
liability on handgun manufacturers. Some manufacturers' guns had a design defect
because they lacked a trigger safety lock,286 some had a manufacturing defect in the
form of a malfunctioning safety lock,287 and some were negligently marketed and
distributed.2 8 These distinct forms oftortious conduct would make meaningless any
determination of either the uniformity of risk or the manufacturers' respective
shares of the market. Presumably, separate market determinations would need to
be made for the market for guns without safety locks, the market for guns with
malfunctioning safety locks, and the market for guns negligently distributed.
3. Uniformity in Degree of Risk
During its 2006 session, the Maryland General Assembly considered and
rejected legislation that would have held manufacturers of lead paint, but not
manufacturers of lead pigment contained in the paint, liable under market share
282. See McGuinness, 608 A.2d at 448.
283. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936-37 (Cal. 1980).
284. Id. at 936.
285. In Hamilton v. Accu-Tek, the district court sought to impose market share liability upon
handgun manufacturers not because the handguns were defective, but because the manufacturers'
negligent marketing and distribution practices made the guns easily accessible to criminals. 62 F. Supp.
2d 802, 844 (E.D.N.Y. 1999), vacated, Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp., 126 F. Supp. 2d 882 (2d Cir.
2001).
286. E.g., Sturm, Ruger & Co. v. Bloyd, 586 S.W.2d 19, 23 (Ky. 1979) (addressing whether the
lack of a safety lock on a gun supported the plaintiff's claim alleging negligent design by a gun
manufacturer); Halliday v. Sturm, Ruger & Co., 770 A.2d 1072, 1092 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001), aff'd
en banc, 792 A.2d 1145 (Md. 2002) (holding the plaintiff's claim failed under the doctrine of misuse
even if the lack of a child safety lock on the gun was a design defect).
287. E.g., Rodriguez v. Glock, Inc., 28 F. Supp. 2d 1064, 1072 (N.D. I11. 1998) (assuming a
malfunctioning safety lock was a manufacturing defect for summary judgment purposes); Abrams v.
Marlin Firearms Co., 838 So. 2d 975, 978 (Miss. 2003) (considering the plaintiffs allegation that the
gun's safety lock malfunctioned).
288. Hamilton, 62 F. Supp. 2d at 845.
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liability.2"9 Yet it was clear that equal amounts of lead paint do not pose uniform
risks. The chemical composition of paint varied widely before 1955; the amount of
lead by weight in paint ranged from less than 2% to more than 70%.29 0 In these
circumstances, market share liability is inappropriate because one unit of one
product posed a risk 35 times as great as another containing much less lead.29' Thus,
a requirement that various manufacturers' products pose a uniform level of risk
remains a foundational premise for market share liability. In the absence of such a
requirement, a manufacturer's share of the market does not reflect its proportionate
share of the harm.
B. Practical Impossibility of Tracing the Victim's Harm to a Specific
Manufacturer
The second Thomas definition, physical indistinguishability, actually is a
secondary factor that serves as a proxy for one of our requirements of market share
liability: the impossibility, as a practical matter, of tracing the harm-causing product
back to its specific manufacturer. Similarly, the first Thomas definition, functional
interchangeability, also affects traceability, but it has a far greater impact on the
judicial determination of market shares. The impact of functional interchangeability
on the judicial determination of market shares is discussed in Section C.
1. Physical Indistinguishability as a Proxy for the Absence of
Traceability
Fungibility in the physical indistinguishability sense, as described by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court,292 is better understood through the lens of the
traceability requirement. Courts should examine the physical indistinguishability
of products to determine whether any given product can be traced back to its
original manufacturer. As previously described, however, physical
indistinguishability is both under- and over-inclusive as a proxy for the traceability
289. See H.B. 1394, 2006 Leg., 421st Sess. (Md. 2006), available at http://mlis.state.md.us/
2006rs/bills/hb/hbI394f.pdf. This bill received an unfavorable report from the house judiciary
committee. MARYLAND LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION, HOUSE BILL 1394 STATUS REPORT,
http://mlis.state.md.us/2006rs/bilIfile/hb1394.htm.
290. Compare AM. STANDARD SPECIFICATIONS, supra note 66, § 2(a) (indicating the voluntary
industry standard adopted in 1955 that limited lead content in paint to no more than 1% of total weight),
with BUREAU OF STANDARDS, U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT MASTER
SPECIFICATION FOR PAINT, WHITE, AND TINTED PAINTS MADE ON A WHITE BASE, SEMIPASTE, AND
READY MIXED (Standard Specification No. lob), in CIRCULAR OF THE BUREAU OF STANDARDS, No. 89,
at 2 (3d ed. 1927) (requiring that white base, semipaste paint purchased by the federal government
include between 45% and 70% white lead).
291. But see Rostron, supra note 17, at 174 (suggesting that one could "adjust market share data
to achieve an allocation of liability that reasonably reflects the likelihood of each manufacturer having
caused a plaintiff's injury"). Under Rostron's theory, one would first determine the market shares of
each paint manufacturer and then adjust the percentages to account for the varying lead concentrations
among them. See supra notes 110-16, 120-31 and accompanying text.
292. Thomas v. Mallett, 701 N.W.2d 523, 560 (Wis. 2005).
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of a product.293 For example, courts can examine factors other than physical
indistinguishability to determine the extent of the traceability problem.294 Further,
fungibility in the physical indistinguishability sense can be manipulable.295 For
instance, Wisconsin has held that lead paint pigment is fungible, while New York
has held that it is not, partly because Wisconsin does not require physical
indistinguishability on the microscopic scale, while New York does.296 The decision
to adopt one standard of physical indistinguishability over another is an inherently
subjective judicial enterprise.
2. Functional Interchangeability as a Traceability Factor
Recall that another of the Thomas definitions of fungibility is functional
interchangeability, that is, each manufacturer's product must be functionally
interchangeable with the product of another.297 This definition affects both the
traceability question and the judicial determination of market shares; the latter is
discussed in Section C.
Even if multiple manufacturers' products are physically indistinguishable and
pose a uniform risk of harm, market share liability still is not justified unless the
products are used for the same or similar purposes. This requirement ensures that
disputed products comprise a single, definable market. For example, in Brenner v.
American Cyanamid Co., the court found that the plaintiffs had "not narrowed the
national market to include only those manufacturers of white lead carbonate that
sold the product for interior residential use." '298 In other words, the plaintiffs had not
limited the market to products that were functionally interchangeable. The Brenner
court continued, "[i]n addition to interior residential paint, white lead carbonate was
used for products such as exterior residential paint and nonresidential paint, uses
that are not alleged to be harmful. Plaintiffs have not produced evidence of any
single defendant's share of the relevant market for interior residential paint use."2 99
Functional interchangeability limits the market to include only the
manufacturers of products used for a specific purpose. This limitation obviously
affects whether the plaintiff can trace the harm-causing product back to its specific
manufacturer. If, for example, evidence exists that the products of a specific lead
pigment were used exclusively in exterior paints, it cannot be claimed that this
specific manufacturer produced pigment used in interior paints.
293. See supra Part V.A.2.
294. See supra notes 174-90 and accompanying text.
295. See supra Part V.A. 1.
296. Compare Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 561 (holding lead paint is physically indistinguishable
because the various differences in lead pigment "are available only on the microscopic scale"), with
Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 853 (App. Div. 1999) (holding lead paint was not
fungible partly because it is physically distinguishable on the microscopic scale). See also supra notes
171-73 and accompanying text.
297. Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 560; Rostron, supra note 17, at 163-64.
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The lack of traceability remains a foundational presumption of market share
liability because it justifies the departure from the traditional tort standard that
requires plaintiffs prove causation. While fungibility understood as physical
indistinguishability most often squares with cases in which the victim cannot trace
the product to a specific manufacturer, it is both under- and over-inclusive.
Functional interchangeability also affects traceability, but it is only a single factor
that may suggest whether it is reasonable to expect the victim to trace her harm to
a specific manufacturer. Instead of focusing on functional intechangeability, courts
should directly address the question of whether it is feasible for the plaintiff to trace
the product that caused her harm to the specific manufacturer that produced it.
3. Traceability: An Impossibility Standard or an Impracticality
Standard?
The extent to which a product must be untraceable to justify applying market
share liability has never been squarely examined in a published opinion. Must it be
impossible, or merely impracticable, to trace a product back to its original
manufacturer? The court in In re Dow Corning Corp.30 0 suggests an impossibility
standard. 30  That case was a bankruptcy action against a debtor who
manufacturered defective breast implants. 3 2 The United States sought to recover
from the manufacturer medical costs that the government provided victims injured
by the manufacturer's breast implants.30 3 Among the many theories the United
States invoked to support its claim was market share liability.3 4 The United States
used this theory to avoid having to identify each and every victim of the
manufacturer's breast implants.3"5 The court did not impose market share liability
because breast implants are not fungible goods.3 6 Fungibility, the court noted,
means that "one defendant manufacturer's product must be indistinguishable from
the next manufacturer's product. 307 Breast implants were distinguishable because
manufacturers used "different designs and compositions. ' '3" Furthermore, the court
added, "[t]he mere fact that it may be difficult for the plaintiff to establish product
identification is insufficient to invoke the market-share theory . . . . [M]ere
300. 250 B.R. 298 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000).
301. See id. at 363. But see Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 927 (Cal. 1980) (footnote
omitted) (noting that one plaintiff was able to identify the manufacturer of the DES her mother took);
Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Mich. 1984) (noting that "[s]ome plaintiffs have
specifically named the product to which they were exposed in utero and its manufacturer.").
302. In re Dow Coming Corp., 250 BR. at 307.
303. Id.
304. Id. at 360.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 363.
307. Id. (citing Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 936 (Cal. 1980); Bly v. Tri-Continental
Indus., Inc., 663 A.2d 1232,1243-45 (D.C. 1995); Hymowitz v. Eli Lily & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069,1075
(N.Y. 1989); 63 AM. JUR. 2d Products Liability § 183).
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difficulty in producing evidence is not sufficient to excuse a party having to do
Market share liability is a departure from the traditional starting point in civil
litigation where a plaintiff must prove all the elements of the tort to recover. As
such, it is reasonable to require a burden beyond mere difficulty of proof to satisfy
the traceability requirement and warrant market share liability.3 '0 At the same time,
the hypothetical ability of the plaintiff to prove the requisite causal connection
between a particular victim and a specific manufacturer should not, in all cases,
prevent the use of market share liability.
Recall that a few DES daughters were able to identify the specific drug
manufacturer whose product their mothers took during pregnancy.3"' For this
reason, we believe that a "practical impossibility" standard best preserves the
integrity of tort law. Such a standard allows the use of market share liability, if the
other requirements are met, in those instances where there is no realistic chance for
an injured consumer to identify the manufacturer of the product causing her harm.
The Supreme Court of Texas used a practical impossibility standard in
Gaulding v. Celotex Corp.3" 2 In that case, a husband purchased from a salvage yard
an asbestos-laden board that he used to make a cabinet for his wife.3 13 Though she
outlived him, the wife died of mesothelioma, an asbestos-related disease, so her
children sued the possible manufacturers of the board under market share
liability.3 14 The court recognized that it was practically impossible for the plaintiffs
to identify the specific manufacturer of the board.3"5 The court did not, however,
impose market share liability because it also was practically impossible to
determine market shares as the board could have been made anywhere at any
time.316 Market share liability would be appropriate, however, in a situation in
which it is possible to determine market shares but practically impossible to
identify the actual tortfeasor.317
309. Id. (emphasis added and citations omitted).
310. See Sindell, 607 P.2d at 936 (modifying traditional principles of causation in exceptional
cases); Hymowitz, 539 N.E.2d at 1075 ("modify[ing] the rules of personal injury liability" for the DES
situation, which posed "'inordinately difficult problems of proof."') (quoting Bichler v. Lilly & Co.,
436 N.E.2d 182, 185 (N.Y. 1982)); Collins v. Eli Lilly Co., 342 N.W.2d 37, 49 (Wis. 1984)
(recognizing that the DES situation posed "difficult problems" that warranted the creation of a new
theory of causation).
311. Sindell, 607 P.2d at 927 (noting that one plaintiff was able to identify the manufacturer of
the DES her mother took); Abel v. Eli Lilly & Co., 343 N.W.2d 164, 168 (Mich. 1984) (same).
312. 772 S.W.2d 66, 71 (Tex. 1989).
313. Id. at 67.
314. Id. at 67, 70.
315. Id. at 71.
316. Id.
317. Hypothetically, if the product in Gaulding had been made by a fixed number of
manufacturers whose market shares in Texas mirrored their national market shares, it would have been
possible to determine market shares but still practically impossible to identify the actual tortfeasor.
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4. Traceability in Parens Patriae and Other Collective Tort Actions
Litigation against the indeterminate manufacturers of harm-causing fungible
products often is brought by a collective entity, such as the state or municipal
government, 31 8 a class-action representative, 31 9 or hospital or medical insurer,
seeking recoupment of medical expenses.320 In these collective actions, particularly
parens patriae actions brought by state or municipal governments, the
untraceability requirement is less important because, by definition, the harm to the
state is collective in nature. The government is therefore not expected to submit
individualized proof establishing causal connections between the harms
experienced by each particular resident and each specific manufacturer and then to
tally the results. Instead, the state or municipality relies upon statistical and
sampling evidence to prove the harm to the collective entity in the aggregate.
In this context, the untraceability requirement assumes a lesser role in
determining whether to apply market share liability. However, the requirement of
judicial capacity to accurately determine market shares assumes a greater
importance. If courts are allowed to use market share liability as a substitute for the
tallying of individually-caused harms, even greater scrutiny of the accuracy of the
trial court's determination of market shares is warranted. The lack of ability to trace
the causal connection between individual victims and specific manufacturers is not
irrelevant. Appellate courts reviewing a trial court's allocation of manufacturers'
shares of financial responsibility under a market share analysis should be wary if
the government plaintiff and the trial court had the capacity to trace causal
connections between individual victims of product-caused harms and specific
manufacturers and instead opted to rely upon market share analysis and statistical
and sampling data.
C. Judicial Competence to Determine Market Shares
With any particular product, several individual factors indicate the feasibility
of a court determining market shares. First, can the time interval during which the
tortious conduct occurred be limited to a finite and reasonably short time-frame?
In the DES cases, the applicable time is only slightly longer than nine months. By
contrast, it is unlikely that courts are capable of meaningfully determining market
318. See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 994 F.2d 112, 114 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting
the city and Philadelphia Housing Authority "brought this action against [the] manufacturers of lead
pigment"); City ofMilwaukee v. NL Indus., Inc., 691 N.W.2d 888,890 (Wis. Ct. App. 2004) (indicating
the city brought the action against lead paint manufacturers); see also Forelle supra note 1, at D7
(reporting the jury verdict awarding the State of Rhode Island damages in a lead paint action).
319. E.g., In re MTBE Prods. Liab. Litig., 175 F. Supp. 2d 593, at 598 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(consolidating putative class actions brought by well owners against benzene manufacturers); Sindell
v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 925 & n. I (Cal. 1980) (involving class actions brought by daughters of
women who took DES); Lewis v. Lead Industries Ass'n, Inc., 793 N.E.2d 869, 871 (111. App. Ct. 2003)
(involving class actions brought by parents of lead poisoning victims).
320. See In re Dow Coming Corp., 250 B.R. 298,307, 363 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 2000) (denying
market share liability claim by the U.S. government acting as health insurer of last resort).
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shares"' in a situation where a child has been poisoned by lead in a home that was
painted multiple times at indeterminate dates between the time that paint containing
lead pigment was first commonly available in the 1870s322 to when the sale of lead
paint was outlawed in 1978.323
The second factor suggesting the feasibility of meaningfully determining
market shares is the length of time that has passed between the time of the product's
manufacture or distribution (regardless of the duration of the period in which
manufacturers may have produced the products that may have caused plaintiffs
harm) and the time of trial." 4 It usually is far easier to determine market shares with
a reasonable degree of accuracy for a product sold and distributed in the 1990s than
for a product sold and distributed in 1890s, even if the periods for which market
shares must be determined are of equivalent length.
The third recurring set of factors influencing the feasibility of the determination
of market shares is the number of producers in the relevant market325 and the
fluidity of entry and exit from that market.326 It is one thing to determine market
shares in a context in which there always were three manufacturers of the harm-
causing product and all three manufacturers began production and stopped
production at roughly the same time. It is far more difficult if there are hundreds of
manufacturers and these manufacturers entered the market at different times, exited
the market at various times, and often re-entered and re-exited the market.
Finally, Thomas's first definition of fungibility, functional interchangeability,
may affect the judicial competence to meaningfully calculate market shares, just as
it does in determining whether a harm-causing product can be traced back to its
321. See, e.g., Santiago v. Sherwin Williams Co., 3 F.3d 546, 550-51 (5th Cir. 1993) (citing
plaintiff s inability to specify the time ofthe manufacturers' negligence as a reason to deny market share
claims); Jefferson v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, 930 F. Supp. 241,247 (E.D. La. 1996), affid, 106 F.3d 1245
(5th Cir. 1997) (citing plaintiff's inability to allege a time when the lead paint was applied as a reason
to deny applying market share liability); Brenner v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 699 N.Y.S.2d 848, 852 (App.
Div. 1999) ("Applying market share liability in the context of this case would result in liability
disproportionate to the risk created."); Donald G. Gifford, The Peculiar Challenges Posed by Latent
Diseases Resulting from Mass Products, 64 MD. L. REv. 613, 658-60 (2005) (discussing courts'
frequent inability to assess shares of liability of individual manufacturers); Rostron, supra note 17, at
209-10 (noting that the "inability of determining the timing of tortious conduct will remain an
insurmountable obstacle to proportional share liability in some circumstances").
322. Skipworth v. Lead Indus. Ass'n, Inc., 690 A.2d 169, 171 (Pa. 1997).
323. See supra note 65.
324. In Sindell, DES was manufactured from 1947 to 1971 and the plaintiff sued in 1976. Sindell
v. Abbott Labs., 149 Cal. Rptr. 138, 151 (Ct. App. 1978), rev'd, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal. 1980); Sheiner,
supra note 5, at 963 n. 1. The lead pigment used in Thomas was available from 1900 to 1980 in
Wisconsin; the suit was filed in 1999. Thomas v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 530 (Wis. 2005).
325. See, e.g., Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d at 937 (noting that five to six companies
controlled 90% of the DES market); Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 570 (Wilcox, J., dissenting) (observing
that there were some 200 paint manufacturers in the Milwaukee area between 1910 and 1971).
326. See, e.g., Skipworth, 690 A.2d at 173 ("Over the one hundred year period at issue, several
of the pigment manufacturers entered and left the lead paint market."); Thomas, 701 N.W.2d at 570-71
(Wilcox, J., dissenting) (detailing the times during which the various pigment manufacturers entered
and exited the market).
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specific manufacturer.3 27 If lead pigment, for example, was an ingredient in a
variety of products other than interior residential paint, then the appropriate market
for determining each manufacturer's market share is not the sales of all lead
pigment, but rather only the sales of all lead pigment used for interior paint. It is
possible, indeed likely, that some lead pigment manufacturers sold their product as
an ingredient in one finished consumer product, while others sold theirs as an
ingredient in a second finished product. These markets must be differentiated if the
volume of product distribution is to serve as a meaningful proxy for harm caused.
This too becomes a complicating factor.
With the addition of the multiple factors outlined above, as well as others not
described, the process of determining market shares becomes geometrically more
complex because of the interaction of the various factors. With lead pigment or lead
paint, the time of possible exposure may be as great as a century, and residences
were painted at unknown times and irregular intervals. With lead paint, the number
of producers numbered in the hundreds. In the case of lead pigment, the product
had multiple uses, many of which posed little or no risk to children. It is difficult
to see how proponents of litigation against manufacturers of lead paint or lead
pigment can convincingly claim that courts are capable of determining the market
shares for these manufacturers with even a reasonable degree of approximation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Childhood lead poisoning is a significant and under-appreciated public health
crisis. Funding is required to address the crisis and to eliminate lead paint hazards,
and it is understandable that many public officials and judges, intellectual heirs of
the 1960s, believe that courts, more than legislatures, are the appropriate
institutions to solve this public health crisis.328 But courts are not legislatures. They
do not have the power to tax specific industries or to appropriate funds to remedy
a pervasive public health crisis. The authority of any court to transfer money from
one party to another is inextricably linked to proof of a required causal connection,
however defined, between the injurer's tortious conduct and the victim's injury.
Market share liability purports to be an alternative means of proving causation, not
a new, extra-constitutional grant of taxation and spending powers to the courts. The
requirements of market share liability outlined here are based on judicial
competence and feasibility. If market share liability in any given factual context
cannot realistically apportion financial responsibilities among manufacturers in a
manner that reasonably approximates the harms caused by each manufacturer, then
the assessment of damages under market share liability is not an appropriate
judicial function.
327. See supra Part VI.B.2.
328. See generally John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Accidents ofthe Great Society,
64 MD. L. REV. 364 (2005) (viewing Guido Calabresi's The Cost ofAccidents, published in 1970, as
both "reflecting the time" and calling for a judicially based "regulatory scheme").
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